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“[S]tandards . . . should be clearly articulated, and then candidly and consistently 
applied. . . . Whatever it is to be, the standard . . . , once announced, should be ad-
hered to in fact as well as in rhetoric.”1
* Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor & Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law, Universi-
ty of Oklahoma.
1. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review 
of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a 
Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 460 (2002).
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Three landmark decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court exhibit uninten-
tional irony: Beam v. Stewart, Smith v. Van Gorkom, and Paramount Communi-
cations Inc. v. Time Inc.  In Beam, the court concluded that, regarding the deci-
sion of whether to seek remedy against Martha Stewart, her fellow directors 
would not have jeopardized their reputations for the minimal gain of continuing 
their business and personal relationships with her.2 Ironically, the court failed 
to acknowledge that Martha Stewart—in trading on material nonpublic infor-
mation, which gave rise to the corporate claim against her—jeopardized her 
reputation (ultimately losing hundreds of millions of dollars and her freedom) 
for minimal gain (less than $50,000).  Having failed to acknowledge that inter-
nal inconsistency and unintentional irony, the court offered no explanation why 
some directors would jeopardize their reputations for minimal gain, but others 
would not do so.  Part I attempts to fill the void and suggests that Stewart suf-
fered from cognitive biases, which would not have affected her fellow directors.
In Van Gorkom, the court famously concluded that the plaintiff carried his 
burden of proving that the board was grossly negligent in informing itself when 
selling the corporation, although, during a multi-month period, no bidder 
stepped forward with a superior proposal.3 The irony of the court’s conclusion 
is virtually self-evident.  Part II further discusses subsequent precedent, which 
suggests that, viewed in retrospect, the board could have carried its burden that 
it reasonably informed itself, turning the conclusion of Van Gorkom on its head, 
and furthering the irony.
In Time, the court held that Time’s board did not preclude Paramount from 
hostilely acquiring Time when it affected an acquisition of Warner.4 According
to the consensus, Time’s board in fact precluded Paramount, so the Time court 
could not have meant what it wrote.  As described in Part III, examining for the 
presence of preclusive action sometimes may enlighten the ultimate inquiry of 
reasonableness, but other times, an examination into preclusion proves mislead-
ing.  In dicta, the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that preclusive 
conduct may be reasonable.5  As the inquiry into preclusion has yielded mis-
leading, if not ironic, results, and as the Delaware Supreme Court has indicated 
that preclusive action may be reasonable, the court should re-examine the utility 
of the preclusion inquiry as an outcome-determinative filtering device regarding 
the ultimate inquiry of reasonableness.
2. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 140, 1052 (Del. 2004) (en banc).
3. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881, 888 (Del. 1985) (en banc).
4. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1989) (“If 
the grant of an auction-ending provision is appropriate, it must confer a substantial benefit upon the 
stockholders in order to withstand exacting scrutiny by the courts.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (“Favoritism for a white knight to the total 
exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable when the latter’s offer adversely affects sharehold-
er interests . . . .”).
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In these foundational decisions of corporate law, the Delaware Supreme 
Court could not have meant what it wrote.  Each section incorporates clarifying 
concepts for consideration, and Part IV briefly concludes.
I.
The law acknowledges several key characteristics of corporations.  First, as 
a corporation is a legal fiction,6 a natural person or persons must make deci-
sions on its behalf.  For a corporation, the decision-maker generally is the board 
of directors, not the investor-shareholders.7 Second, decisions of the board of
directors generally are shielded from challenge by the shareholders by the busi-
ness judgment rule.8 The protections of the business judgment rule extend to 
the decision of whether to pursue a cause of action on behalf of the corpora-
tion.9 However, if the board members breached a duty that they owe to the cor-
poration, giving rise to a cause of action by the corporation against those board 
members, then we would expect that neither the corporation—which is a legal 
fiction incapable of acting for itself—nor the board members—who would be 
unlikely to sue themselves—to seek to remedy the wrong.10 In such situations, 
the law empowers shareholders to step into the shoes of the corporation to initi-
ate a cause of action on behalf of the corporation against the board members.11
Such suits are termed derivative, as the shareholders’ claim derives from the 
claim belonging to the corporation.
However, if a shareholder pursues a derivative suit, it is legally insufficient 
for the shareholder to simply name board members as defendants; otherwise, 
shareholders would too easily supplant the board’s authority to manage the cor-
poration.  In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated an inquiry to 
balance (1) the shareholder’s right to remedy wrongs committed by board 
members against the corporation, and (2) the overarching principle that the 
board of directors, not shareholders, makes decisions on behalf of the corpora-
tion.12 According to Aronson, to survive a motion to dismiss a derivative claim, 
the shareholder must plead facts with particularity giving reason to doubt that 
(1) a majority of the board was disinterested or independent or (2) the chal-
lenged decision was a valid exercise of business judgment.13
6. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”).
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 
(2016).  The board of directors may delegate day-to-day operations to officers and employees.  See, 
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2019); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.40, 8.41 (2016).
8. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
9. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991).
10. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949).
11. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
12. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–15 (Del. 1984).
13. Id. at 814. The law encourages shareholders to exhaust internal remedies by demanding 
that the board seek the shareholder’s preferred remedy before initiating a derivative suit. FED. R.
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In Beam v. Stewart,14 the Delaware Supreme Court applied the Aronson in-
quiry, and the results were unintentionally ironic.  In concluding that the plain-
tiff-shareholder did not plead particularized facts giving reason to doubt that a 
majority of the board members was disinterested or independent, the court em-
phasized the lifelong investment that the board members had made in their 
reputations—concluding that those individuals would be unwilling to trade on 
their reputations for minimal gain by appeasing another board member, Martha 
Stewart, who was also the majority shareholder and the genuine target of the 
underlying claim.15  All the while the court failed to acknowledge that multi-
millionaire Martha Stewart herself had jeopardized her reputation, as well as her 
vast wealth and her freedom, for minimal gain—less than $50,000.16 So, if 
Martha Stewart jeopardized her reputation for minimal gain, was the court 
wrong to credit the board members’ value of their own reputations?  No, but 
having failed to acknowledge the unintentional irony of its own analysis, the 
court failed to explain why Stewart did so, but the other board members would 
not have done so.  Part I. attempts to fill that void.  Part A. sets forth the facts of 
the case and the court’s holding.  Part B.1. presents a rational cost-benefit anal-
ysis (CBA) theoretically undertaken by Stewart and concludes that the costs ex-
ceeded the benefits of her actions.  Part B.2. then presents cognitive biases that 
may have infected Stewart’s CBA and contributed to her irrational actions.  Part 
C. extends the analysis to the other members of the board of directors and posits 
that those individuals would not have succumbed to those cognitive biases.
A.
On behalf of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc. (MSLO), a sharehold-
er initiated a suit to recover damages suffered by the corporation attributable to 
Martha Stewart’s alleged illegal trades in the stock of ImClone—a pharmaceu-
tical company—as well as her attempts to cover up the illegality.17
The key players were friends and associates.  Sam Waksal was the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of ImClone as well as a former suitor of Stewart’s 
daughter.18 Importantly, Waksal and Stewart provided one another with recip-
CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. If the board refuses the shareholder’s demand, and the share-
holder nonetheless pursues a derivative suit, then the shareholder concedes that the board is disin-
terested and independent. Levine, 591 A.2d at 212. But cf. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 
(Del. 1996) (footnote omitted) (limiting Levine by recognizing that, “[i]f there is reason to doubt 
that the board acted independently or with due care in responding to the demand, the stockholder 
may have the basis ex post to claim wrongful refusal”).
14. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004) (en banc).
15. Id. at 1047, 1052.
16. Superseding Indictment ¶ 21, United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) [hereinafter DOJ Indictment]; Complaint ¶ 19, SEC v. Stewart, No. 03-CV-4070 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 4, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Complaint].
17. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1044.
18. Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 968 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
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rocal investment advice and assistance, and they shared a stockbroker at Merrill 
Lynch, Peter E. Bacanovic, who previously worked at ImClone.19 When 
MSLO made its initial public offering of common stock in 1999, Bacanovic 
sold $10 million of the shares to Stewart’s friends, including Waksal.20 Waksal 
encouraged and assisted Stewart’s investment in ImClone and other compa-
nies.21
For years, ImClone devoted significant resources to developing a promising 
cancer drug, Erbitux.22 ImClone described Erbitux as its “lead product candi-
date,” emphasizing its significance to the company’s future.23 On October 31, 
2001, ImClone submitted to the FDA the final materials associated with its ap-
plication for a license regarding Erbitux.24 The FDA had until December 31, 
2001 to decide whether to accept the application for filing.25 If the FDA issued 
a Refusal to File (RTF) letter, then ImClone would have to commence new and 
costly trials.26
Not yet known publicly, “FDA reviewers found ImClone’s application to be 
inconclusive and questioned Erbitux’s efficacy. . . . Waksal knew that investors 
would be stunned by [the prospect of an RTF letter.  So he] . . . personally 
call[ed] officials at the FDA.”27 On December 26, 2001, before any formal ac-
tion by the FDA, Waksal privately learned that the FDA had decided to issue an 
RTF letter regarding Erbitux.28 Waksal alerted his daughter of the develop-
ment: “I thought that until I get the letter from the FDA and I know what’s real-
ly happening, I’m not doing anything wrong.”29
On the morning on December 27, 2001, the day before ImClone publicly 
disclosed that it received an RTF letter from the FDA, Waksal’s daughter called 
Douglas Faneuil, Bacanovic’s assistant at Merrill Lynch, to place an order to 
sell all of her ImClone shares.30 Waksal’s accountant also called Faneuil to or-
der the sale of all of Waksal’s ImClone shares.31 Faneuil spent the morning 
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 968–69.
22. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 9; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 13.
23. ImClone Sys. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 1, 2002).
24. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 12; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 13.
25. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 12; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 13. 
26. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 12; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 13.
27. EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL 202–03 (2016).  
28. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 14. In 2004, however, the FDA approved Erbitux. 
SOLTES, supra note 27, at 204.  Bolstered by the drug’s success, Eli Lilly acquired ImClone in 2008 
for $6.5 billion, a significant amount above its $5 billion value at the time of Waksal’s and Stew-
art’s disputed trades in late December 2001. Id.
29. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 203.
30. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶¶ 8, 15; see also DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 13, 
15.
31. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 15; see also DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 13.
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talking to Bacanovic and others at Merrill Lynch about whether Waksal or his 
daughter could sell their ImClone stock.32 The same morning, pursuant to 
Bacanovic’s instructions, Faneuil informed Stewart that Waksal and his daugh-
ter were selling, or attempting to sell, all of their ImClone shares and that Baca-
novic believed that Stewart might wish to act on that information.33 Stewart 
then instructed Faneuil to sell all of her ImClone shares.34 Faneuil immediately 
placed an order to sell all 3,928 of Stewart’s ImClone shares and that order was 
executed at an average price of $58.43.35
On December 28, the FDA sent ImClone an RTF letter.36 After the market 
closed on December 28, ImClone issued a press release, which disclosed that 
the FDA had issued an RTF letter.37 At the close of the next trading day, Mon-
day, December 31, the price of ImClone stock dropped 16% to $46 a share.38
By selling one day before ImClone announced that the FDA had issued an RTF 
letter, Stewart avoided losses of $45,673.39
In June 2003, Stewart was charged criminally by the Department of Justice 
and civilly by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).40 Although 
Stewart was never convicted of securities fraud,41 she was convicted of conspir-
acy, obstruction of justice and false statement charges and sentenced to five 
months in prison and five months of home confinement.42 Stewart settled the 
SEC’s enforcement action by consenting to a final judgment that imposed: (1) 
disgorgement of $45,673, representing losses avoided from her insider trading, 
plus prejudgment interest of $12,389; (2) a maximum civil penalty of $137,019, 
representing three times the amount of losses avoided; (3) a five-year bar from 
serving as a director of a public company; and (4) a five-year limitation on her 
service as an officer or employee of a public company.43
32. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 15.
33. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶¶ 15-16; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 18.
34. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 17; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 19.
35. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 17; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 19.
36. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 14.
37. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 19; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 14.
38. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 14; see also DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶  20.
39. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 21; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶  19.
40. See DOJ Indictment, supra note 16; SEC Complaint, supra note 16.
41. Stewart was not indicted for insider trading.  She was indicted for securities fraud—
making false statements to the public, in the wake of the federal charges, regarding the reasons for 
her trades in ImClone stock.  According to the government’s theory, by falsely asserting her inno-
cence regarding her sales of ImClone, Stewart intended to deceive MSLO investors to maintain an 
artificially high share price in MSLO. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 60.  Stewart was acquitted 
of securities fraud. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
42. Constance L. Hays, Marth Stewart’s Sentence: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES (July 
17, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/17/business/martha-stewart-s-sentence-overview-5-
months-jail-stewart-vows-ll-be-back.html?register=facebook.
43. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovi, 03 Civ. 4070 (RJH) 
(S.D.N.Y.), lit. rel. no. 19794, 2006 WL 2252393 (Aug. 7, 2006).
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When news broke regarding the governmental investigations into Stewart’s 
ImClone trades, the stock of MSLO plummeted.44 Monica A. Beam, a share-
holder of MSLO, filed a derivative action against Martha Stewart and five other 
members of MSLO’s board of directors in August 2002.45 Beam filed the de-
rivative suit without making a demand on MSLO’s board to remedy the alleged 
wrong.46 When MSLO’s board moved to dismiss the derivative suit for failure 
to make a demand upon it, the plaintiff responded that any such demand should 
be excused as futile because there was reason to doubt that a majority of the 
board was disinterested or independent.47
The MSLO board of directors consisted of six members: Stewart, Sharon L. 
Patrick, Arthur C. Martinez, Darla D. Moore, Naomi O. Seligman, and Jeffrey 
W. Ubben.48 The complaint alleged sufficient facts to doubt the disinterested-
ness and independence of two directors, Stewart and Patrick, for purposes of 
considering a pre-suit demand.  Stewart’s potential civil and criminal liability 
for the acts underlying Beam’s claim rendered Stewart an interested party and 
therefore unable to consider demand objectively.49 Patrick’s full-time position 
as an MSLO officer, together with the substantial compensation she received 
from MSLO, raised a reasonable doubt as to her ability objectively to consider 
pre-suit demand, given Stewart’s controlling interest in MSLO.50 Ubben’s dis-
interestedness and independence went unchallenged.51  Consequently, the 
Chancery Court was left to address allegations of the complaint, and the reason-
able inferences that flow therefrom, to determine where Beam raised a reasona-
ble doubt regarding the disinterestedness or independence of Martinez, Moore, 
or Seligman.  The Chancery Court emphasized that those outside directors had 
invested in their reputations and would not have jeopardized their reputations by 
rejecting a demand by a shareholder to pursue a meritorious action to appease 
Stewart, if a demand had been made.52 The Chancery Court dismissed the suit.53
In affirming, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court’s 
emphasis on reputation—examining whether “the non-interested director would 
be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the 
interested director.”54
Having focused on the value that the directors placed on their reputation, 
and their unwillingness to trade on their reputation to appease Stewart for some
44. Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 968 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
45. Id. at 977.
46. Id. at 976.
47. Id. at 976–77.
48. Id. at 977.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 977–78.
51. Id. at 969 n.9, 978–84.
52. Id. at 978–84.
53. Id. at 984.
54. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004).
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nominal gain, the court failed to appreciate the irony of its conclusion: By trad-
ing on material nonpublic information, Martha Stewart risked her reputation, 
along with millions of dollars and her freedom, to avoid the loss of less than 
$50,000.  The Delaware Supreme Court implicitly contemplated corporate ac-
tors undertaking clear-headed cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  If the Delaware Su-
preme Court mistakenly assumed that one corporate actor (Martha Stewart) 
would undertake clear-headed CBA, was the court mistaken in assuming that 
other corporate actors (MSLO’s outside directors) would undertake clear-
headed CBA?  Part B. concludes that Stewart did not undertake CBA and that 
she succumbed to cognitive biases.  Part C. concludes that cognitive biases 
would not have affected the outside directors’ consideration of a pre-suit de-
mand, if such a demand had been made.
B.
1.
“[I]nside traders are[] . . . rational decision-makers [and] ‘highly-skilled’” at 
CBA.55 If Martha Stewart had undertaken clear-headed CBA prior to her con-
templated sale of ImClone stock, then she probably would not have authorized 
the trade.  CBA would have required Stewart to compare the gains from trading 
on material nonpublic information, in light of their likelihood of occurrence, 
against the losses from trading on material nonpublic information, in light of 
their likelihood of occurrence.  Future gains and losses would be discounted ac-
cordingly.  Plus, she would have undertaken an analogous inquiry before her 
actions to cover-up the disputed trades.  This part focuses only on the disputed 
trades.
The gains acquired—more accurately, the losses avoided56—by selling her 
ImClone shares prior to public disclosure of the negative development regard-
ing Erbitux would have enabled her to sell at a higher, rather than at a lower, 
price.  We know ex post that she enjoyed a gain of less than $50,000.  The in-
quiry should be ex ante.  An RTF letter may prompt significant depreciation in 
stock price,57 with the magnitude of the drop hinging on the overall importance 
55. James B. Stewart, Risk vs. Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2012, at A1 (quoting Preet Bha-
ra, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York); see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-
ment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. ECON. PERSP. 169 (1968) (discussing Becker evaluating the 
likely costs and benefits of parking illegally, before doing so).
56. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 612 (8th ed. 2011) (explaining 
how losses avoided can be construed as “gains”).
57. See Jennifer King, Unforced Errors: FDA Refusal to File or Receive Letters, CAMARGO
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://camargopharma.com/2017/01/unforced-errors-fda-refusal-file-receive-
letters/ (“For Catalyst, their stock price plummeted by 37% in a single day and the company was 
required to commit to an expensive and time consuming additional Phase 3 clinical study. In the 
case of PTC Therapeutics, the company’s stock fell by 80% . . . . It is too soon to see the full impact 
of the action on Innocoll, but in the short term, the company stock fell by 65% on the first day of 
trading after the regulatory action.”).
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of the drug to the company.  ImClone described Erbitux as its “lead product 
candidate,”58 so Stewart should have expected a significant drop, which ex post
amounted to sixteen percent.59 In the best-case scenario, Stewart would have 
gained approximately $228,000, based on her ownership stake of 3,928 shares 
and on ImClone’s stock price of approximately $58 per share, which assumes 
that price fell to $0 on the Erbitux news.  Now, $50,000 (and certainly 
$228,000) is a lot of money to me, and may be a lot of money to you, but Mar-
tha Stewart is the person of interest.  At the time of the trade, Stewart was worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars.60 A gain of $50,000 (or even $228,000) is not 
significant to one worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  As a rule of thumb in 
the regulation of securities, some consider as immaterial any amount less than 
five percent.61 $228,000 comprises only 0.23 percent of $100,000,000, and 
$50,000 only 0.05 percent.  For Stewart, the focus is on financial gains, but she 
may have experienced non-financial gains by engaging in the disputed trades.  
Perhaps, she enjoyed psychic gain, as some enjoy the rush from risky behavior; 
think bungee jumping.
In undertaking CBA, Stewart would have considered the likelihood that she 
would realize those gains.  Because the RTF letter was nonpublic at the time of 
Stewart’s trade, its public disclosure would cause ImClone’s stock price to fall 
with virtual certainty.62 So, whatever one’s ex ante view of the magnitude of 
the fall, the ex ante likelihood of a fall approached one hundred percent.
Against the likely gains, Stewart would have compared the costs of her 
trades in ImClone stock in light of their likelihood of occurrence.  Viewed ex
ante, trading on material nonpublic information could have caused—and ex post
58. ImClone Sys. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 1, 2002).
59. See DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 20; SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 14.
60. Clare O’Connor, Martha Stewart Preps Sale of Empire Once Worth $2 Billion, FORBES,
(June 19, 2015, 3:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2015/06/19/martha-stewart-
preps-sale-of-empire-once-worth-2-billion/#393d2fea7d46 (reporting that Stewart became a billion-
aire in 2000, and was ranked in Fortune’s list of 400 richest people in America, but fell off that list 
in 2001).  Stewart owned almost thirty-four million shares of MSLO, Martha Stewart Living Om-
nimedia, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 30, 2002), which had a closing price of 
$16.97 per share on December 28, 2001.  MSO, HISTORICAL STOCK PRICE.  So, based only upon 
her ownership stake in MSLO, Stewart was worth more than $500 million at the time of her disput-
ed trade.  
61. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 621 (8th ed. 2017).  But see SEC Staff Accounting Bull. No. 
99 (Aug. 12, 1999) (rejecting bright-line approach to materiality).
62. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  Some argue that, given the time that it 
took the brokers at Merrill Lynch to reach Stewart, the information may no longer have been non-
public.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against 
Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14 (2006).  The brokers, 
however, acted as if there was urgency to the trade, which suggests that the market price did not 
fully reflect the information.  See DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 14. Of course, if Stewart 
thought that she had not engaged in illegal trading, then she would not have needed to engage in any 
cover up the sale.  Moreover, CBA focuses upon one’s beliefs, which may not reflect the true state 
of affairs.  Consequently, arguments that Stewart did not actually engage in illegal insider trading 
generally miss the mark.
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did cause—Stewart to suffer massive financial losses.  First, news of Stewart’s 
suspicious trades in ImClone stock would have prompted a fall in the stock 
price of MSLO because Stewart was the face of that company.63 As an imper-
fect analogue, Michael Milken, who was the face of Drexel Burnham Lambert, 
pled guilty to insider trading and was sentenced to prison, which was the begin-
ning of the end of that firm.64 Milken/Drexel is unlike Stewart/MSLO in that 
Milken’s business involved the trading of securities, whereas Stewart’s business 
was not related to securities and, instead, involved cooking and decorating.  
Nonetheless, as Stewart was the face of MSLO, her suspicious trades would 
harm the share price of her company.65 News of the allegations against Stewart 
prompted a steep decline in MSLO’s stock price.66 As the majority shareholder 
of MSLO, Stewart lost hundreds of millions in value.67 Of course, shareholder 
losses prompted the derivative suit against Stewart.
Stewart also risked her positions as director and CEO of MSLO.  The SEC 
could, and ultimately did,68 secure her removal from those managerial posi-
tions.69 As an employee of MSLO, Stewart did not receive compensation for 
her service as a director.70 As CEO, Stewart was compensated, in the years 
leading up to the suspicious trades, as set forth in the following chart.71
63. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (July 29, 
1999) (“Our business would be adversely affected if Martha Stewart’s public image or reputation 
were to be tarnished. . . . Our continued success and the value of our brand name therefore depends, 
to a large degree, on the reputation of Martha Stewart.”).
64. See Kurt Eichenwald, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
1990, at A1; Brett Duval Fromson, The Last Days of Drexel Burham, FORTUNE, May 21, 1990, at 
90.
65. See generally Brooks Barnes, Weinstein Company Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2018, at B2 (reporting that production company filed for bankruptcy after Harvey 
Weinstein, the face of the company, was publicly accused of sexual misconduct).
66. Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 969 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004) 
(“After barely two months of . . . adverse publicity, MSO’s stock price had declined by slightly 
more than 65%.”); see also Charles Gasparino et al., Martha Stewart Shares Drop 21% Amid Con-
troversy over Stock Sale, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB1024957422696586960 (reporting that prices fell $3.42, or 21%, to $12.55).  Cf. Constance L. 
Hays & Tracie Rozhonsept, Is There Life for Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Without Martha?,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/05/business/is-there-life-for-martha-
stewart-living-omnimedia-without-martha.html (noting that a weak economy contributed to those 
losses, but attributing most losses to Stewart’s trades).
67. Recall that Stewart owned almost thirty-four million shares of MSLO. When the Associ-
ated Press broke the news of Stewart’s trades on the evening of June 6, 2002, MSLO’s closing price 
was $19.01, which steadily fell to $11.47 on June 29, 2002.  DOJ Indictment, supra, note 16, ¶ 58.
During that period, the value of Stewart’s stake in MSLO fell more than $250 million.
68. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 43.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(f) (2012).
70. MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA INC., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION (2003).
71. Id.; MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA INC., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION (2001).





Potential Value of 
Option Awards at 
Assumed Annual Rates 





2001 $900,000 $1,156,666 0 0 0 $647,737
2000 $900,000 $1,770,000 150,000 $2,505,750 $6,350,655 $2,322
1999 $1,055,044 $300,000 0 0 0 $2,270
1998 $2,975,000 $1,695,717 0 0 0 $4,050
Those amounts seem significant, but arguably would not be material to one 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  Even if the amounts were not material to 
Stewart, the positions as CEO and director would have been significant to her, 
as she would have wanted to continue those managerial roles in the company 
that bore her name.72 During the sentencing hearing, Stewart told the judge, “I 
have lost my job. I have lost my position in my company. I am no longer the 
CEO of Martha Stewart Omnimedia . . . . That makes me angry and sad.”73
If she traded illegally in ImClone stock, Stewart would face significant civil 
and criminal liability, including jail time.74 Ultimately, Stewart settled the ad-
ministrative allegations against her,75 paying relatively inconsequential 
amounts, but, as mentioned above, the settlement included bars that prevented 
her from serving as a director or officer of MSLO.76 In the criminal proceeding, 
a jury convicted Stewart, not of insider trading and not of securities fraud,77 but 
of obstructing the investigation into her trades of ImClone stock and of making 
false statements to investigators.78 The court sentenced her to five months in 
prison plus five months of home confinement, placed her on probation for nine-
teen months, and imposed a relatively small fine.79
72. See Jeff Bercovici, Don’t Blame Greedy Martha Stewart for MSLO’s Crummy Stock,
FORBES (Aug. 1, 2011, 6:12PM) (describing Stewart as a “control freak”).
73. Krysten Crawford, Martha: I Cheated No One, CNN (July 20, 2006, 6:21 AM).
74. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 
102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
75. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 43.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
78. Kara Cannell & Matthew Rose, Martha Stewart is Found Guilty of All Charges, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2004, 4:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107833235519345426; Crawford, 
supra note 73.  
79. Constance L. Hays, Martha Stewart’s Sentence: The Overview; 5 Months in Jail, and 
Steward Vows, ‘I’ll Be Back,’, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/
2004/07/17/business/martha-stewart-s-sentence-overview-5-months-jail-stewart-vows-ll-be-
back.html.
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Of course, Stewart risked and ultimately damaged her reputation. One’s 
reputation suffers after being publicly reprimanded for deviating from accepted 
standards or by suffering an adverse court judgment.80  Speaking to reporters 
outside of the courthouse following her sentencing hearing, Stewart said, it was 
a “shameful day,”81 as her “public image had been one of trustworthiness.”82
Losses must be discounted by their likelihood of occurrence, and that likeli-
hood largely equaled the likelihood that the disputed trades would be detected 
by regulators or the public. None of those losses would be realized unless Stew-
art’s suspicious trading was detected.  As an initial matter, insider trading is be-
lieved to be detected at a low rate.83 Nonetheless, Stewart probably could not 
have objectively believed that her trades in ImClone stock would go undetect-
ed.84
The government has a broken-windows, zero-tolerance approach to insider 
trading.85 A layperson may be ignorant of the fundamentals of insider trading 
or the government’s zealous pursuit of those who engage in insider trading, but 
Martha Stewart could not claim such ignorance.  Stewart once worked for a 
brokerage and was intimately familiar with the stock market.86 Her broker 
prompted Stewart to trade by alerting her that Waksal was unloading shares.  
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required Waksal to publicly 
disclose his sales of ImClone stock,87 and those sales on the eve of the FDA’s 
RTF letter would have prompted investigation by the government and the pub-
80. See Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 497, 515 (1992) (discussing ethical codes and professional norms).  
81. Crawford, supra note 73; see Constance L. Hays & Tracie Rozhonsept, Is There Life for 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Without Martha?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/05/business/is-there-life-for-martha-stewart-living-omnimedia-
without-martha.html (discussing rebranding of MSLO).  
82. Jeffrey Toobin, Lunch at Martha’s, NEW YORKER (Feb. 3, 2003) (quoting Stewart from 
an interview conducted post-ImClone-trade, pre-trial); see also Jeffrey Toobin, A Bad Thing, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 22, 2004)), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/03/ 22/a-bad-thing (“humil-
iation and conviction”).
83. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal In-
sider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1262 (1995).
84. See SOLTES, supra note 27, at 226 (noting that Waksal could not have expected to escape 
detection).
85. See Mary Jo White, Chairman of the Sec. & Exch. Comm., Remarks at the Securities 
Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100913mjw.  See gener-
ally SOLTES, supra note 27, at 205–06 (“An astounding number of intelligent and well-paid execu-
tives are caught engaging in illicit trading each year.  Between 2010 and 2014, regulators in the
United States brought more than four hundred successful civil and criminal cases.”).  To increase 
the perception of the likelihood that one will be caught, the government subjects defendants to “perp 
walks.” Id. at 38.
86. See, e.g., SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 6 (“[I]n the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, 
Stewart was a registered representative for [a] broker-dealer. . . . From June 2002 to October 2002, 
Stewart was a member of the Board of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.”); DOJ 
Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 2.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012); see ImClone Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 
(Apr. 23, 2001) (discussing compliance with Section 16).  
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lic.88 Being subject to Section 16 for purposes of her trades in MSLO,89 Stew-
art would have been aware that Waksal was subject to Section 16 regarding 
ImClone.
Any governmental investigation into insider trading begins, but does not 
end, with the target.  According to the former head of enforcement for the SEC:
We’ve created databases to see who is trading in tandem, even if [we] know noth-
ing about an event . . . . It’s a trader-based approach, not an issuer-based approach. 
These trading patterns are the first clue to what might be insider trading rings. [We] 
then have to do the real detective work, pulling phone records and e-mails and us-
ing other techniques to uncover the links.90
Stewart would have known that any investigation into Waksal’s trades would 
extend to any trades by his friends and associates, including her.91 Moreover, 
they shared a broker,92 which provided an avenue for suspicion and ultimately 
culpability.  As noted above, the government searches for suspicious trading in 
tandem, notwithstanding the occurrence of a material event.  However, ImClone 
did experience a material event.  The temporal proximity of Stewart’s trade to 
ImClone’s public disclosure of the negative development regarding Erbitux 
would have heightened governmental scrutiny.  Finally, the nature of her 
trade—complete liquidation—also would have heightened governmental scruti-
ny.
The expected losses from Stewart’s suspicious trades dwarfed the expected 
gains of those trades.
2.
If CBA counseled against effectuating the trade in ImClone stock, why did 
Stewart affect the trade?  “[F]ictitious . . . are the deliberation and struggle that 
are envisioned to emerge during decision making.”93 The typical white-collar 
88. The Wall Street Journal routinely spotlights the largest trades by insiders.  See Insider-
Trading Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3023-
insider.html.
89. See, e.g., Martha Stewart, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc., Statement of Changes 
in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4/A) (Dec. 4, 2015); Martha Stewart Family LP, Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia Inc., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Dec. 4, 2015); 
see also Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 31, 2000) 
(discussing compliance with Section 16). 
90. James B. Stewart, In a New Era of Insider Trading, It’s Risk vs. Reward Squared, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/business/insider-trading-persists-and-
gets-stealthier.html (quoting Robert S. Khuzami, Director of Enforcement, SEC).
91. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 11. (“At all times relevant to this Indictment, Martha 
Stewart and Samuel Waksal were personal friends”); SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 10 (“Stewart 
became friendly with Waksal in the early 1990s.”).  
92. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 7 (“[[Bacanovic’s] clients included Stewart, Waksal, 
and Waksal’s daughter, Aliza.”); id. ¶ 10 (“Stewart knew that Waksal had an account with Baca-
novic.”).
93. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 318.
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criminal does not, on a yellow legal pad, write pro-and-con columns regarding 
the contemplated action.94 According to an accountant who facilitated insider 
trading, “I just never really thought about the consequences . . . . The money 
was nominal . . . . I never once thought about the costs versus rewards.”95 Even 
Waksal conceded this point about his illegal trades, “I don’t know what I was 
thinking . . . . I wasn’t, sadly.”96  One’s decision-making process may be cor-
rupted by cognitive biases.97 This section does not exhaustively survey cogni-
tive biases; instead, it, along with Part I.C.2, introduces certain biases and offers 
a theory differentiating the court’s treatment of Stewart (who traded on her rep-
utation to gain little at great expense) and the other board members of MSLO 
(who would not have traded on their reputations to gain little at great expense).  
According to one scholar, Martha Stewart succumbed to cognitive biases re-
garding her non-suspicious trades contemporaneous to her suspicious trades in 
ImClone,98 which suggests that her decision to trade her ImClone stock also 
may have been the product of cognitive biases.
Time does not allow for deliberative CBA regarding every decision.  In-
stead of deliberative CBA, we commonly employ short-cuts based upon intui-
tion.  One’s intuition regarding insider trading may be faulty because of selec-
tive views regarding the trade, the salience of the victims and the harm that they 
suffer, nonfeasance as opposed to malfeasance, the distant consequences of the 
trade, and inadequate scrutiny.
Business executives, including Martha Stewart, know that insider trading is 
illegal, but the contours that delineate legal and illegal are far from clear.  Those 
fuzzy borders certainly impact rational CBA, but also contribute to faulty intui-
tion.99 I may surpass the 55MPH speed limit, but, even though I know that 
speeding is illegal, I do not view myself as a criminal.  My faulty intuition is 
that I know better about the appropriate speed of travel, notwithstanding the 
judgment of elected officials and administrators who possess expertise and da-
ta.100 I misperceive the risks that attend speeding because the crime seems vic-
timless and because, until I get into an accident, the victims are unknown and 
unknowable.  Many commentators believe that insider trading should not be il-
legal, for similar reasons, which will be explored in the following paragraphs.101
94. Id. at 91.
95. Id. at 99 (quoting Scott London); id. at 13–16 (discussing Scott London who facilitated 
insider trading for objects worth less than $70,000—concert tickets, Rolex watch, a few envelopes 
of cash—ending his thirty-year career as a successful accountant and his $900,000 annual salary).
96. Id. at 226 (quoting Sam Waksal).
97. Id. at 314.  
98. Meir Statman, Martha Stewart’s Investment Lessons, 7 J. INV. CONSULTING 52 (2005).
99. See Fiflis, supra note 82, at 515 (discussing ethical and industry norms that may provide 
discipline).  
100. Given low detection rates, rational CBA may lead one to exceed the speed limit, but 
that’s beside the point.
101. For a deeper treatment of insider trading, see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND 
THE STOCK MARKET (1966), STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY
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The salience of the victim and the salience of the harm suffered by the vic-
tim impact one’s intuition regarding illegal conduct.102  One’s intuition about 
the conduct is negatively impacted if the victim is unknown and unknowable.103
Waksal, who pled guilty to insider trading, objected to the sentencing judge ref-
erencing his securities fraud in the same breath as Enron and WorldCom.104
From Waksal’s perspective, Enron and WorldCom “cook[ed the] books,” and 
those affirmative misrepresentations cost thousands of people their jobs.105
Waksal seemingly distinguished between the malfeasance of Enron and World-
Com and the nonfeasance of his silence in the face of a duty to disclose.106
Faulty intuition is more closely related to nonfeasance than malfeasance.107
Like Waksal, Stewart remained silent when trading her shares of ImClone.  In 
an interview with Barbara Walters, Martha Stewart said, “I didn’t cheat any-
body out of anything.”108
Some, seemingly including Waksal and Stewart, view insider trading as a 
victimless crime.  If Martha Stewart had not traded, the counterparty to her 
trade would have traded at the same price with a different party,109 as millions 
of shares of ImClone were traded daily on NASDAQ.110 If the counterparty 
would have traded at the same price anyway, Martha Stewart arguably did not 
victimize that individual and did not cause harm to that individual.  Moreover, 
Stewart did not know the counterparty to the trade, which occurred on the mar-
ket, not face-to-face.  Empathy for others—and one’s intuition regarding the 
(2014), FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW, 253-275 (1991); DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION (1991).
102. See SOLTES, supra note 27, at 323 (“For deterrence to directly impact behavior, the aver-
sion to engaging in particular conduct needs to become so salient that individuals are overtly con-
cerned.”). 
103. Charities understand this concept, personalizing victims and beneficiaries. In its televi-
sion ads, the ASCPA depicts individual victimized animals and, when requesting donations, states 
that contributors will receive a photo of an animal that has been given a second chance.  
104. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 201.
105. Id.; see id. at 329.
106. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2018); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
669 (1997) (referencing the obligation of an insider to “abstain or disclose”); Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 249 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same).
107. See Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecuto-
rial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 189–90 
(1998).
108. Crawford, supra note 73 (“Stewart, who has been steadfast in proclaiming her inno-
cence, told Walters, ‘I didn’t cheat the little people. . . . We’re all little people. I didn’t cheat any-
body out of anything.’”).
109. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 101, at 193.
110. See Profile—ImClone Sys. Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE (Aug. 31, 2001) (reporting daily aver-
age volume for prior three months of 1.38 million shares), https://perma.cc/UZ58-SADL. Eli Lilly 
acquired ImClone, so its shares are no longer traded.  See Shirley S. Wang, Lilly Agrees to Acquire 
ImClone for $6.5 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB122329145082307287.
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wrongfulness of conduct—is impacted by physical proximity to and causation 
of the harm.111 “Economic harms fundamentally differ from other acts in that 
they do not trigger gut feelings of actually doing harm, as [is] the case with in-
timate, physical harm.”112
Whether or not an insider’s trade harms the counterparty, according to the 
Supreme Court, insider trading damages the integrity of the market and thus 
harms all investors.113 Others reject that position.  For insider trading to be 
profitable, the market price must not reflect the inside information; by trading 
on that information, the insider informs the market.114 Market participants ben-
efit from more accurate pricing.115 Moreover, insider trading may be treated as 
a form of compensation, which could lower the entity’s costs, benefitting inves-
tors.116 Even if one accepts the Supreme Court’s position, the abstract nature of 
the market as victim does not aid one’s intuition regarding the inappropriateness 
of insider trading.
Just as physical distance impedes one’s intuition regarding the inappropri-
ateness of conduct, so too does temporal distance.117 Though Waksal would 
have promptly reported his trades in ImClone stock,118 Section 16 would not 
have required Stewart to report her trades in ImClone.119 Her trades did not 
come to light until months later.120 As the consequences, whether for the victim 
or the perpetrator, become temporally distant, one’s intuition regarding inap-
propriate conduct becomes worse.121
111. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 116–18, 126.
112. Id. at 120; see id. at 326 (“When regulators in the United Kingdom questioned Douglas 
Flint, chairman of HSBC, about the aiding of tax avoidance in his firm’s private banking operations, 
he argued that: ‘I don’t feel that proximate to what was happening in the private bank.’ But when 
the chairman who oversees a firm doesn’t deeply relate to his firm’s problems, who will seek to 
instill different norms?”).
113. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 653 (1997).  Cf. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 329 
(“According to the executive who committed insider trading, it’s the ones who committed financial 
fraud who really damaged the integrity of the financial markets.”).
114. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 101, at 176–77; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 101, 
at 257.
115. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 101, at 176–77; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 101, 
at 257.
116. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 101, at 176-177; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 101, at 
257-59. On the other side of the ledger, deregulating insider trading would increase volatility, risk, 
and the perception of unfairness.  Id. at 260–61.
117. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 324 (“China once doled out the death penalty for white-collar 
convicts, but even with this ultimate punishment looming, executives continued to engage in corpo-
rate mischief. . . . Sanctions, even when incredibly severe, are often just too far removed and remote 
to become relevant to executives in their everyday decision making.”). 
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012).
119. Nonetheless, an obligation to abstain or disclose may have arisen.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 
240.10b5-1, -2 (2000); Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
120. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶¶ 17, 58 (noting that, on June 6, 2002, the Associated 
Press broke the news of Stewart’s trade, which occurred on December 27, 2001).
121. See SOLTES, supra note 27, at 126–29.
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One’s real-world action may deviate from the course that would have been 
chosen in a sterile setting because of inadequate scrutiny of that action.122
Sam Waksal remembers one of the first conversations he had with his lawyer, Lew-
is Liman, after being indicted for committing securities fraud in conjunction with 
his insider trading.  “I kept saying to him that I didn’t really do anything wrong,” 
Waksal recalls.  “Lewis said to me, ‘Sam, would you have done the same thing if 
you were being filmed?’ ”  Waksal remembers pausing to think about the question 
and soon responded: “probably not.”  With the powerful tools at the disposal of 
regulators to monitor trades, it’s difficult to imagine that people like Waksal 
couldn’t appreciate that trades by family members were being carefully watched.  
Yet, Waksal never . . . had that gut feeling telling him to stop.  “I don’t know what 
I was thinking. . . . I wasn’t, sadly.”123
One’s decision may be anchored by the actions of others, and inadequate scruti-
ny of that anchored position may result from time pressure and a lack of differ-
ing viewpoints.  The initial recommendation of an advisor may serve as an an-
chor which the ultimate decision-maker cannot overcome.124 On the date of her 
trade, Merrill Lynch relayed information to Stewart to persuade her to sell—not 
buy and not hold—her ImClone stock.  Merrill Lynch set the anchor: Sell
ImClone.125
When pressed for time, one may side-step what one knows to be the correct 
behavior.  For example, John M. Darley and C. Daniel Batson conducted an ex-
periment on students at Princeton Theological Seminary.126 Those students 
were asked to hurry to an adjacent building to deliver comments on the Good 
Samaritan,127 but who one-after-another bypassed (and, in some instances, 
stepped over) a groaning victim positioned by the researchers in the path of the 
students.128 “[E]xecutives are constantly engaged in a whirlwind of meetings, 
travel, and e-mails.  With incessant demands on their time, they take few oppor-
122. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 314; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2498 (2004) (noting that those who are overburdened 
may not spot nor account for cognitive biases).
123. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 226.
124. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (1997) 
(“Often people make probability judgments on the basis of an initial value, or ‘anchor,’ from which 
they make insufficient adjustments. The initial value may have an arbitrary or irrational source.”)
(footnote omitted).
125. Stewart was slow to affect any trade.  Statman, supra note 98, at 53-59.  She was slow to 
trade losers, despite the tax benefit of doing so.  Id. at 55–56.  And she was slow to trade winners 
for fear of missing out on additional future gains.  Id. at 56.  In December 2001, Bacanovic con-
vinced her to realize some tax losses to offset some tax gains.  Id. at 54.  Those trades—in which 
she suffered losses—may have made her more willing to sell ImClone for a gain, when contacted by 
Merrill Lynch to do so.
126. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational 
and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 100 (1973).
127. Id. at 102.
128. Id. at 104, 107. 
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tunities to slow down, ruminate on their judgments, and engage in . . . more re-
flective thinking.”129
Stewart was travelling and pressed for time on the date of her ImClone 
trade.130 “Within minutes” of learning that Waksal “urgently” sought the sale 
of his shares of ImClone and that it was “imperative” that the sale take place on 
the morning of December 27, 2001, Merrill Lynch left a message for Stewart 
that ImClone was “going to start trading downward.”131 At the time of Merrill 
Lynch’s call, Stewart was on an airplane.  When the plane landed to refuel, 
Stewart checked her messages, contacted Merrill Lynch, and learned that 
Waksal was trying to sell his ImClone stock. Aware that the stock price was 
falling, aware that the company’s CEO was selling his stake, and aware that her 
plane soon would be airborne, Stewart directed Merrill Lynch to liquidate her 
holdings of ImClone.132 Discussions with those who present an alternative view 
may counter erroneous initial intuitions,133 but no one presented Stewart with an 
alternative view of the anchored decision to sell ImClone.134 Contrary to delib-
erative CBA, Stewart, seemingly affected by cognitive biases, decided to sell 
her ImClone stock.
C.
Beam, the plaintiff-shareholder, failed to make a demand on MSLO’s board 
of directors to remedy the harm that Stewart allegedly inflicted upon MSLO.  
Thus, the board was not required to affirmatively respond to such a demand nor 
justify any decision.  Part C.1. employs CBA and concludes that the directors’ 
business and personal relationships with MSLO and Stewart would not have 
meaningfully impacted their consideration of Beam’s claims.  Part C.2. exam-
129. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 152.
130. SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 19.
131. DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶¶ 16-17. When discussing the Waksal’s trades with his 
assistant, Faneuil, “Bacanovic exclaimed: ‘Oh, my god! Get Martha on the phone!’” Thomas S. 
Mulligan, Broker’s Former Aide Says Martha Stewart Was Tipped, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-feb-04-fi-martha4-story.html (quoting Faneuil’s
testimony regarding Bacanovic’s statement).  When Faneuil questioned whether he could disclose 
the Waksals’ trades to Stewart, Bacanovic replied: “Of course!  You must.  That’s the whole point!”
Id. (same).  
132. See DOJ Indictment, supra note 16, ¶ 17; see also SEC Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 19.
133. SOLTES, supra note 27, at 320.  Outsiders, however, may not provide the optimal check.  
Id. at 315 (“‘When the CEO is in the room, directors—even independent directors—tend to want to 
try to please him,’ [former Tyco CEO Dennis] Kozlowski explained.  ‘The board would give me 
anything I wanted.  Anything.’ Not surprisingly for Kozlowski, this created a feeling of entitle-
ment.”).
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Stewart’s broker sought her rubber-stamp on 
the sale of ImClone because he didn’t want to risk another loss in her portfolio and possibly her loss 
as a client.  Statman, supra note 98, at 57 (quoting email from Stewart to Bacanovic, dated Nov. 11, 
2000) (“The account is a mess . . . . I think it’s time for me to give my money to a professional 
money manager who will take a bit more care about overall market conditions and political and 
economic problems.”).
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ines cognitive biases and concludes that such biases would not have meaning-
fully affected the board’s consideration of Beam’s claims.
1.
Corporate law entrusts boards of directors with the management of the cor-
poration’s business, including the pursuit of lawsuits on the corporation’s be-
half.135 Corporate law contemplates that, prior to initiating a derivative cause of 
action, a shareholder generally must make a demand on the board of directors to 
seek the desired relief.136 If a shareholder pursues a derivative cause of action 
without first making a demand on the board of directors, then, when the corpo-
ration moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to make a demand, the court 
reviews the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff pled facts with particu-
larity giving reason to doubt that a majority of the board is disinterested or in-
dependent regarding a pre-suit demand.137 In Beam, the shareholder failed to 
make a demand on the board comprised of six individuals, so the plaintiff had to 
meet the requisite pleading threshold regarding a trio of directors.138
The plaintiff raised a reasonable doubt about the disinterestedness and inde-
pendence of Stewart and Patrick.  Stewart was the target of governmental en-
forcement actions regarding her trades and there was a significant likelihood 
that she would be civilly and criminally liable.139 Patrick was a full-time em-
ployee of MSLO, and, given Stewart’s controlling interest, Stewart could affect 
Patrick’s employment and compensation, which raised reasonable doubts about 
Patrick’s disinterestedness and independence.140
The plaintiff-shareholder still had to raise a doubt regarding one of the re-
maining directors, none of which was an employee of MSLO.  If those outside 
directors, on behalf of MSLO, had pursued an action against Stewart, they 
would have jeopardized their directorial positions with MSLO.  Stewart was 
known to fire people with whom she disagreed,141 and, as majority shareholder, 
she was empowered to remove any or all directors, with or without cause.142
The plaintiff did plead facts regarding Stewart’s controlling interest and her 
135. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); see also Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 
(Del. 1991).
136. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; Levine, 591 A.2d at 200.
137. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813–15 (Del. 1984).
138. Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 977 (Del. Ch. 2003). At the time that the complaint was 
filed, August 15, 2002, MSLO’s board was comprised of six individuals. Id. Those six individuals 
constituted the board for purposes of evaluating demand futility. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 977–78.
141. See Jeff Bercovici, Don’t Blame Greedy Martha Stewart for MSLO’s Crummy Stock,
FORBES (Aug. 1, 2011, 6:12PM)), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/08/01/dont-
blame-martha-stewart-for-mslos-crummy-stock/#7f5d92e614bf (“Martha Stewart is a control freak 
who . . . fires anyone who disagrees with her.”).
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2016).
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ability to remove directors.143 However, the plaintiff did not plead facts regard-
ing the materiality to any outside directors of the fees paid by MSLO for such 
service.  In fact, the financial condition of each of the outside directors appears 
to render immaterial the director fees paid by MSLO.  At MSLO, outside direc-
tors received an annual retainer of $20,000, attendance fees for board and com-
mittee meetings, and additional fees for service as committee chair.144
Before joining the MSLO board of directors in January 2001, Martinez 
served as the CEO of Sears Roebuck & Co.  As CEO of Sears, Martinez earned 
over $1 million annual salary in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.145 During 
that five-year period, he received a bonus that averaged more than $1 million 
annually, “other” compensation that averaged more than $300,000 annually, 
and long-term incentive payouts that averaged more than $850,000 annually.146
As of January 2000, Martinez also had in-the-money options to acquire shares 
of Sears valued at over $8.3 million.147 Martinez served as a director of other 
corporations, including PepsiCo, Inc.  As an outside director at PepsiCo, Inc., 
Martinez annually received a retainer comprised of options to acquire $210,000 
of PepsiCo, Inc. stock, which could immediately be exchanged for cash in the 
maximum amount of $70,000.148 In addition, Martinez annually received op-
tions to acquire $150,000 of PepsiCo, Inc. stock, three-fifths of which could be 
immediately exchanged for cash of $30,000.149 Martinez’s financial independ-
ence was secure, regardless of whether he served on MSLO’s board.150
Darla Moore, who was a successful banker in her own right, married bil-
lionaire Richard Rainwater in 1991, and eventually assumed managerial respon-
143. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1054 (Del. 2004); Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d at 
978.
144. Beam, 833 A.2d at 967–68; Martha Stewart Proxy Statement, supra note 60, at 11. Note, 
however, that those amounts do not compare favorably with amounts paid to directors of large pub-
licly-traded corporations. Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, Directors’ Pay Ratchets Higher As Risks 
Grow, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-directors-pay-ratchets-
higher-as-risks-grow-1456279452 (“The median pay of an S&P 500 board member is $255,000 a 
year.”).
145. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 15 (Mar. 20, 1997) [here-
inafter 1997 Sears Proxy Statement]; Sears Roebuck & Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 15 
(Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Sears Proxy Statement].  
146. See, e.g., 1997 Sears Proxy Statement, supra note 145, at 15; 2000 Sears Proxy State-
ment, supra note 145, at 15.  
147. See 2000 Sears Proxy Statement, supra note 145, at 18.
148. PepsiCo, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 6 (Mar. 24, 2000).
149. Id. at 7.
150. The Delaware Supreme Court indicated that the plaintiff abandoned the claim regarding 
Martinez’s disinterested and independence.  Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1053 n.33. (Del. 
2004). The allegations against Martinez necessarily failed because the allegations against him were 
weaker than those against Moore and Seligman, and because the allegations against that duo were 
inadequate.  Id. 
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sibilities for an entity that he founded.151 Her financial independence was se-
cure, regardless of her service on MSLO’s board.
Naomi Seligman was a senior partner at an e-commerce consulting firm; her 
salary at that firm has not been disclosed to the public.  She also served on nu-
merous boards of directors, several of which disclose director fees to the public.  
For her service as a non-employee director at Dun & Bradstreet Corp., Selig-
man received, in 2002, stock options with a nominal grant value of $80,000 and 
an annual retainer of $75,000.152 As a non-employee director at Akamai Tech-
nologies, Inc.,  Seligman received an option to acquire 50,000 shares of stock 
upon joining the board and options to acquire 20,000 shares for each year of 
service.153 As a non-employee director at John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Seligman 
received, in 2002, an annual retainer of $30,000 and an option to acquire stock 
worth half of that amount.154 As a non-employee director at Sun Microsystems, 
Inc., Seligman received nominal cash amounts for attending board and commit-
tee meetings, an option to acquire at least 10,000 shares upon joining the board 
and an option to acquire 10,000 shares for each additional year of service.155 As 
a non-employee director at Exodus Communications, Inc., Seligman received, 
for 2001, nominal cash consideration, and, in 2000, an option to acquire 20,000 
shares.156 As a non-employee director at Ventro Corp., Seligman received an 
option to acquire 12,500 shares and an additional option to acquire 5,000 shares 
for each year of service.157 The plaintiff-shareholder faced the burden of raising 
reasonable doubt regarding Seligman’s presumed disinterestedness, and the 
plaintiff pled no facts regarding the materiality of the director fees that Selig-
man received from MSLO.  Seligman must be treated as disinterested regarding 
the receipt or loss of director fees from MSLO.
The plaintiff’s amended complaint included no allegations specific to Ub-
ben, so his presumed disinterestedness and independence remained unrebut-
ted.158
151. Peter Elkin & Patricia Sellers, Richard Rainwater: Remembering a Billionaire Dealmak-
er, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/28/richard-rainwater-obituary/.
152. See The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 18 (Mar. 14, 2002).  
In 2001, she received stock options with a nominal grant value of $50,000 and an annual retainer of 
$50,000. Id.
153. Akamai Tech., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7 (Apr. 16, 2002).
154. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 4 (Aug. 6, 2002).
155. Sun Microsys., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Sept. 30, 2002).
156. Exodus Commc’n, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 26, 2001).
157. Ventro Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 26, 2001).
158. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1046 n.6 (Del. 2004); see also Beam v. Stewart, 
833 A.2d 961, 969 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2003). L. John Doerr served as a director of MSLO, but his service 
ended in March 2002, prior to the time that Beam filed her complaint.  The complaint against Doerr 
was dismissed with prejudice and not appealed. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1044 n.2. Nonetheless, Doerr’s
financial independence was secure, regardless of his service on MSLO’s board.  He was a general 
partner with Kleiner, Perkins, Caufiled & Byers, a successful venture capital firm.  In 2002, Doerr 
was worth hundreds of millions, on his way to becoming a billionaire. The Forbes 400: #391 L. 
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Aside from financial considerations giving reason to doubt a director’s dis-
interestedness, one’s independence may be questioned due to a personal rela-
tionship of a bias-producing nature.159 For example, co-ownership of a private 
plane, given the requisite expense to acquire and coordination to use, suggested 
a bias-producing relationship between those owners.160 Or, a fifty-year friend-
ship, which was accompanied by political donations totaling thousands of dol-
lars from one to the other, suggested a bias-producing relationship.161 However, 
a bald assertion by a plaintiff-shareholder that a director is a “friend” of the tar-
geted individual proves inadequate for pleading purposes.  Otherwise, any 
shareholder could too easily overcome the demand requirement and too easily 
supplant the board as the decision-maker regarding corporate litigation.  In 
Beam, the plaintiff did offer additional facts regarding Moore and Seligman.  
Regarding Moore, the plaintiff asserted that both Stewart and Moore attended a 
wedding reception honoring the daughter of Stewart’s personal attorney.162
Even if the reception was limited to close friends, the requisite link is missing.  
Accepting that B is close friends with A and that B is also close friends with C 
does not support the conclusion that A is sufficiently close to C that their rela-
tionship is of a bias-producing nature.  Regarding Seligman, the plaintiff pled 
that, in her capacity as a director of Wiley, Seligman—at Stewart’s request—
”express[ed] concern” regarding a biography that would be critical of Stew-
art.163 However, “express[ing] concern” would be consistent with Seligman’s 
duties as a director of MSLO and Wiley.  First, in her capacity as a director of 
MSLO, Seligman would be fulfilling her duties to MSLO by acting to protect 
Stewart’s reputation as Stewart was the face of MSLO and any damage to her 
reputation would be harmful to MSLO and its shareholders.164 Second, in her 
capacity as a director of Wiley, Seligman would be fulfilling her duties to Wiley 
by “express[ing] concern” regarding any biography critical of its subject be-
cause such biographies give rise to litigation that could harm Wiley and its 
shareholders.165
By appeasing Stewart and forgoing a meritorious claim against her on the 
corporation’s behalf, the outside directors would preserve their positions and the 
John Doerr, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2002); The Forbes 400: #91 John Doerr, FORBES (2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/.
159. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050.
160. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 130 (Del. 2016).
161. Del. Cty. Emps. Retirement Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1021 (Del. 2015); id. at 
1022–24 (supplementing its conclusion regarding the parties’ personal relationship with the infer-
ence that the interested director could have affected the other’s employment and compensation).
162. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1045, 1054.
163. Id. at 1046.
164. Beam, 833 A.2d at 980–81; see Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Registration 
Statement (Form S-1) (July 29, 1999) (“Our business would be adversely affected if Martha Stew-
art’s public image or reputation were to be tarnished. . . . Our continued success and the value of our 
brand name therefore depends, to a large degree, on the reputation of Martha Stewart.”).
165. Beam, 833 A.2d at 981.
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attendant fees, which, as set forth above, were not material, and preserve their 
personal relationships with Stewart, which, as set forth above, were not deep 
relationships of a bias-producing nature.  Regarding the costs borne by outside 
directors of appeasing Stewart and forgoing a meritorious claim against her, the 
Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court correctly emphasized the im-
portance of reputation.166 “[O]utside directors . . . have considerable invest-
ments in reputation;”167 they are “the most reputationally sensitive people in the 
world.”168 Attaining a sterling reputation generally requires time, effort, and 
money.169 Investments in reputation amount to sunk costs with minimal salvage 
value.170 Rational actors generally are unlikely to gamble with their reputa-
tions.171 Consequently, the Delaware courts inquire whether a “non-interested 
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the rela-
tionship with the interested director.”172 Because the outside directors had 
made a lifetime of investments in their reputations,173 and would not rationally 
squander them, the Delaware courts correctly concluded that there was no rea-
son to doubt the disinterestedness or independence of the outside directors.174
2.
Although cognitive biases seemingly contributed to Stewart’s decision to 
sell ImClone stock, when CBA counseled against such a sale, cognitive biases 
166. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051; Beam, 833 A.2d at 879–86.  
167. Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: 
Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 535 (1989).
168. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1812 (2001) 
(quoting Nell Minow).
169. See Fiflis, supra note 80, at 515 (“[T]he investment-banking industry’s stock in trade is 
its reputation and assets, which provide a valuable bond, already incurred, to assure that the banker 
will act carefully and skillfully.”).
170. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contrac-
tual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 617 (1981); see generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, su-
pra note 101, at 97 (discussing firm-specific investments of human capital).
171. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 137 (Erwin Cherminsky et al. 
eds., 6th ed. 2003) (“Most contracts are complied with not out of fear of legal action but out of con-
cern with reputation . . . .”).
172. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004). See generally Skeel, supra note 168, 
at 1818 & n.23 (discussing a printer who was acquitted of insider trading, Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222 (1980), but who was devastated and drifted from job to job); Bryan Burrough, After 
the Fall, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at A1.
173. See Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 980 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“One might say that Mar-
tinez’s reputation for acting as a careful fiduciary is essential to his career–a matter in which he 
would surely have a material interest. . . . [I]t is clear that Moore’s professional reputation similarly 
would be harmed if she failed to fulfill her fiduciary obligations.”).
174. But see Skeel, supra note 168, at 1834 (noting that “[i]f a manager’s skills are so valua-
ble that people will transact with her regardless of her reputation, . . . shaming sanctions are less 
likely to prove effective”).  While this logic may apply to Stewart, who returned to MSLO after the 
five-year ban, it is not clear that it applies to any of the outside directors.  
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seemingly would not have meaningfully affected the consideration by the out-
side directors of any pre-suit demand to pursue a remedy against Stewart.175
The Delaware courts acknowledge the possibility that cognitive biases may 
affect a board’s decision-making process regarding a suit against an insider.176
The decision to sue is complex, increasing the potential effect of bias.  Nonethe-
less, the biases that seemingly impacted Stewart seemingly would not have im-
pacted the board in deciding whether to initiate a cause of action against Stew-
art.  Regarding Stewart’s trade, the victim was unknown and unknowable 
because the trade was not face-to-face but occurred in the market.  Moreover, 
Stewart arguably did not victimize the counterparty to the trade, as that individ-
ual would have traded anyway at the same price with another trader in the mar-
ket.  If MSLO’s cause of action against Stewart was meritorious, then the board 
would harm MSLO and its shareholders by failing to pursue that suit.  The di-
rectors would be harming the very parties to which they owed fiduciary duties, 
not unknown nor unknowable parties.177 The directors would have been keenly 
aware of MSLO’s falling stock price in the wake of the news regarding Stew-
art’s trades, so the harm suffered by MSLO and its shareholders was known.
Whereas Stewart did not sufficiently scrutinize Merrill Lynch’s suggestion 
that she sell her ImClone stock (an “anchor”) due to time pressure and an ab-
sence of alternative viewpoints, the board, in considering an action against 
Stewart, would not be subject to disabling time pressure and would be presented 
with alternative viewpoints.  One might argue that a shareholder’s demand sets 
the anchor at the pursuit of the shareholder’s requested remedy.  However, the 
board may be predisposed not to sue the corporation’s managers, especially the 
CEO, who is appointed by the board.178 Unlike Stewart who was prompted to 
175. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1048–49 (“In the context of presuit demand, the burden is upon the 
plaintiff . . . to overcome the presumption . . . that [directors] were faithful to their fiduciary du-
ties.”).
176. See In re Oracle Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[C]orporate directors 
are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed in social institutions.  Such institutions have 
norms, expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence and channel the behavior of those who 
participate in their operations.”); see also Dooley & Veasey, supra note 167, at 529 (“[I]n cases in 
which demand is required, the possibility must be recognized that the board in at least some instanc-
es may be subject to a bias . . . that would not be overtly discernible to the court, but which would 
make the justifications advanced for dismissal appear implausible to the court (if substantive review 
of those reasons were permissible).”) (quoting ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORP GOV, Tentative Draft No. 
8, at 65-66 (1988)); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the 
Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Con-
trols, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 286 n.6 (2004) (“Courts occasionally remark about the psychology of those 
[directors] they are about to find responsible, suggesting the capacity for delusion and obsession.”). 
See generally Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 112 n.430 (“I admit empirical studies show that corporate 
boards are subject to error in firm value projections, usually on the overconfident side of the equa-
tion.”).
177. Certainly, daily trading volume renders many shareholders unknown and unknowable to 
the board members. Nonetheless, the board members face shareholders at annual meetings and like-
ly interact with large shareholders, including institutions with which they may have existing rela-
tionships.
178. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2017).
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make a quick decision to sell her ImClone stock because she was briefly on the 
tarmac as her plane refueled, because she just learned that ImClone’s CEO was 
selling his shares, and because the market price would soon reflect such non-
public news, the board would not be subject to similar time pressures regarding 
the initiation of a potential suit against Stewart.  The limitations period would 
allow for assemblage of information and a methodical decision.179 Even though 
the agendas for board meetings tend to be full,180 the board need not act at any 
particular meeting and can always convene a special meeting.
Whereas Stewart heard a recommendation to sell ImClone and no alterna-
tive viewpoints, the board, in considering an action against Stewart, would hear 
alternative viewpoints.  First, the board would hear advocacy for a position—
the demand from the plaintiff-shareholder to seek remedy against Stewart181—
that might be contrary to the position to which they might otherwise be dis-
posed, and almost certainly contrary to the position advocated by Stewart.  
Moreover, directors commonly retain counsel (or create a committee (a Special 
Litigation Committee, or SLC), which retains counsel) to address any share-
holder demand.182 Counsel would advise the directors by offering the pros and 
cons of various courses of action, that is, alternative viewpoints.  Moreover, 
counsel could offer expertise.  Exposure to expertise as well as alternative 
viewpoints should inform the board’s or SLC’s decision and lessen the risk of 
cognitive bias.183
Cognitive bias may also be muted by subsequent review.184 If a board re-
fuses a shareholder’s demand or if the board delegates to an SLC which moves 
to dismiss the derivative complaint, the board or SLC knows that its decision is 
179. See In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 584 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A three-year statute of 
limitations applies to breaches of fiduciary duty.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (2017) 
(providing for a three-year limitations period).
180. See Langevoort, supra note 176, at 293.
181. If the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the board, then the plaintiff bypassed an op-
portunity to present the case to the board, thereby requiring her to plead particularized facts giving 
reason to doubt that a majority of the board was disinterested and independent.  
182. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2017); see generally Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (discussing the creation of the special litigation committee of the board); 
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350–51 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (discussing the creation of an 
independent committee, its retention of counsel, its investigation, and a report documenting its con-
clusion).
183. See Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1765, 1768–69 (1998); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2502 (2004). But see Arlen, supra, at 1784 (noting that experts may suffer 
from the same cognitive biases as lay people).
184. See Kenneth B. Davis, Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries 
of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1326–29 (2005); id. at 1317 (“[T]he decision is 
being closely monitored by shareholders, lawyers and the financial press, and . . . the decision will 
likely be challenged if it favors the other directors . . . .”).
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subject to judicial (and nonjudicial) review.185 Judicial scrutiny may mute the 
cognitive bias of the board or SLC.186
A Delaware court would review deferentially a board’s refusal of a demand 
unless the shareholder could meet the pleading standard of Aronson.187 Howev-
er, when considering an SLC’s motion to dismiss the derivate suit, the court 
would, in effect, review the SLC’s decision de novo, exercising its own business 
judgment.188 Unlike the review of a typical decision of the board—e.g., wheth-
er to sell widgets—which would merit deference, a court is well-equipped to 
consider whether litigation should be pursued.  Consider the factors proffered 
by an SLC in moving to dismiss, virtually all of which seem within a court’s 
competence:
(1) the asserted claims appeared to be without merit; (2) costs of litigation, exacer-
bated by likelihood of indemnification; (3) wasted senior management time and 
talents on pursuing litigation; (4) damage to company from publicity; (5) that no 
material injury appeared to have been done to company; (6) impairment of current 
director-defendants’ ability to manage; (7) the slight possibility of recurrence of vi-
olations; (8) lack of personal benefit to current director-defendants from alleged 
conduct; (9) that certain alleged practices were continuing business practices, in-
tended to be in company’s best interests; (10) legal question whether the com-
plaints stated a cause of action; (11) fear of undermining employee morale; (12) 
adverse effects on the company’s relations with employees and suppliers and cus-
tomers.189
“[T]he decision whether to continue a derivative suit is not, strictly speaking, 
one uniquely within the directors’ natural business aptitude and beyond the abil-
ities of the court.”190
Some scholars assert that board decisions regarding suits against insiders 
are not the product of CBA and result from cognitive biases.191 For example, 
185. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 
(Del. 1981); see also Davis, supra note 184, at 1316 (“highly visible setting”).  
186. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259 (1999); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and 
Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1787 (2004) (“The prospect of judi-
cial review helps stiffen the backbone of the independent director.”). See generally Dynamics Corp 
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 481 
U.S. 69 (1987) (Judicial review of directors’ decisions “makes directors overcautious . . . .”).
187. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Levine, 591 A.2d at 212; cf. Grimes v. 
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996) (limiting Levine by recognizing that, “[i]f there is reason 
to doubt that the board acted independently or with due care in responding to the demand, the 
stockholder may have the basis ex post to claim wrongful refusal” (footnote omitted)), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
188. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789 & n.18 (quoting the chancery court); id. at n.18. (“Under our 
system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the merits of litigation.”).
189. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 284 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d on other 
grounds, 617 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982).
190. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83, 109 (1985).  
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the board or SLC may be biased in favor of another member of its group and 
against any non-member of that group.  Such an in-group bias could prejudice 
the members of the board or SLC against the plaintiff-shareholder’s assertions 
and in favor of their peer, Stewart, who was targeted by the plaintiff-
shareholder.192 However, one might conceive of the in-group so that any bias 
favors initiation of a suit against the insider: What if the in-group is comprised 
of minority shareholders, such the in-group includes the plaintiff-shareholder 
and the outside directors, who would then be biased against Stewart, the majori-
ty shareholder?193 What if the in-group is comprised of members of the SLC 
who would then be biased against a defendant like Stewart, who would be ex-
cluded from membership on that committee?194
Other biases support those who remain skeptical of the conclusions reached 
by boards and SLCs.  If the board or SLC begins its process with minds closed 
to the plaintiff’s assertion, then the board or SLC may view evidence through a 
biased lens and rationalize its pre-determined outcome.195 For example, the 
board or SLC may underestimate the value of the plaintiff’s suit and overesti-
mate the costs of the suit, in reaching a biased conclusion that the suit should 
not be pursued.196 However, the board or SLC likely will be advised counsel, 
who may mute erroneous estimations of those benefits and costs.  Moreover, in 
the Zapata setting, the SLC will, with the assistance of counsel, justify to the 
court its conclusion that the shareholder’s suit should be dismissed via a written 
191. Id. at 90 (“The near perfect record of derivative suit defendants before their boards or 
committees is statistically so unexpected as to suggest that the defendants’ colleagues have simpli-
fied the complex decision by editing the choices to foreclose further consideration of the choice to 
continue suit.”) (footnote omitted); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or 
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 620 & n.60 (1982) (“Rarely” do independent directors 
conclude that continuation of a derivative suit furthers the interests of the corporation.  “Undoubted-
ly, there are occasions on which counsel opined so favorably with respect to the plaintiff’s claims or 
the independent directors examined the facts so critically that they felt obliged to seek repayment 
from the insiders, or to seek some form of settlement, or to permit part or all of the suit to contin-
ue.”).  
192. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 190, at 99; Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Lim-
its of Director Independence, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 237, 249-53.  See generally Davis, supra note 184, 
at 1308 (“These factors include the CEO’s and other corporate insiders’ practical control over nom-
inating new directors and removing incumbents; business relationships that may exist between out-
side directors and the corporation; the common cultural and professional background of many direc-
tors, and the frequent social ties among them; SLC members may often be CEOs or directors of 
other corporations and in that capacity be themselves defendants in a derivative suit (or see them-
selves as potential defendants); SLC members will have an ongoing collegial relationship with the 
director-defendants after possibly subjecting them to liability; a ‘circle the wagons’ ethic among 
board members when confronted with a challenge from the outside; and the role of the defendant-
directors in selecting the SLC membership.”).
193. Cf. Page, supra note 192, at 251.
194. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788 (“First, the Court should inquire into the independence . . . of 
the committee . . . .”); Davis, supra note 184, 1322-24.
195. Page, supra note 192, at 262.
196. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 190, at 85–91; Page, supra note 192, at 262–72.
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report.197  Professor Davis argues that plaintiffs’ derivative suits generally do 
not provide opportunities where the benefits exceed the costs; otherwise institu-
tions would commonly be the plaintiffs, which does not occur.198 Instead, he 
continues, deterrence commonly is the goal, but derivative litigation need not 
provide that deterrence.
[B]oards and board committees with larger numbers of more independent directors, 
activism by institutional investors, private enforcement of the federal securities 
laws, and white-collar criminal prosecution [serve] . . . as powerful deterrents to 
corporate misconduct . . . . [The] task of inquiry and reporting is a primary focus 
of several national newspapers with expanded business and financial coverage, 24-
hour television news along with cable networks, and web sites devoted exclusively 
to business and financial news. All stand ready and able to pursue and keep alive 
any serious story of corporate misdeed.199
Nonetheless, given the dearth of instances in which the board or SLC embraces 
the shareholder’s assertion,200 the critics may be right, but the attack is so 
broad-sided that it may prove too much.  Over time, the law responded to critics 
by increasing the number and role of outside, disinterested directors.201  Both 
statutes and common law encourage decisions by outside, disinterested directors 
when there is self-interest by an insider.202 Giving credence to theoretical cog-
nitive biases of directors in the area of derivative litigation jeopardizes the va-
lidity of their widespread use elsewhere.203 So, while the Beam court reached 
an internally inconsistent and ironic result, cognitive biases may explain the 
court’s unacknowledged disparate treatment of Stewart and the outside direc-
tors.
197. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
198. Davis, supra note 184, at 1355–56.
199. Davis, supra note 184, at 1353–54.
200. Contra Brudney, supra note 191, at 620 n.60 (“Undoubtedly, there are occasions on 
which counsel opined so favorably with respect to the plaintiff’s claims or the independent directors 
examined the facts so critically that they felt obliged to seek repayment from the insiders, or to seek 
some form of settlement, or to permit part or all of the suit to continue.”); Steven J. Cleveland, A
Failure of Substance and a Failure of Process: The Circular Odyssey of Oklahoma’s Corporate 
Law Amendments in 2010, 2012, and 2013, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 221, 227–28 (2015); Russell Gold, 
Chesapeake Tweaks Big Payday, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2011, at B1 (explaining how following a 
lawsuit by shareholders, Chesapeake rescinded its multi-million-dollar purchase of antique maps 
from its CEO, who had experienced financial difficulties, which prompted the initial transaction).  
201. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007).
202. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2017); Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 
304 (Del. 2015); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
203. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 167, at 535 (“[T]he entire course of American corporation 
law has emphasized the importance of board independence and encouraged the appointment of out-
side directors.” (footnote omitted)).  
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II.
Commentators have criticized the Delaware Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
Smith v. Van Gorkom that the directors breached their duty of care.204 Criticism 
commonly focuses on the court’s conclusion that the board was grossly negli-
gent in informing itself at the time of its initial decision to sell the company 
when it authorized the signing of a merger agreement.  Part II addresses one as-
pect of the case that has drawn less attention—the court’s analysis regarding the 
post-signing market check, which, in the court’s opinion, did not cure the 
board’s failure to be informed at the time of its initial decision.  Though the Van 
Gorkom court concluded that the board was grossly negligent in informing it-
self, despite the post-signing market check,205 the court’s rationale was internal-
ly inconsistent and unintentionally ironic.  Moreover, in subsequent, unrelated 
decisions, the court embraced the actions that the board took regarding its post-
signing market check, further revealing the irony of the Van Gorkom decision.
Part A. briefly presents the facts of Van Gorkom and the court’s analysis.  
Part B. presents the irony of the court’s analysis regarding the post-signing 
market check.  Part C. presents those subsequent legal developments that further 
reveal the irony of Van Gorkom.
A.
In Van Gorkom, Tran Union’s Chairman and CEO (Jerome W. Van 
Gorkom)—without authorization by the board of directors—approached a noted 
deal-maker (Jay A. Pritzker) and suggested an acquisition of the corporation at 
$55 per share, when the corporation’s stock was trading around $38 per 
share.206 After minimal negotiation—and virtually no negotiation regarding the 
price207—Van Gorkom and Pritzker reached an agreement, which required ap-
proval by Trans Union’s board and its shareholders.208
Van Gorkom convened a board meeting on one days’ notice, but without 
providing notice of the purpose of the meeting, and without distributing any 
204. Robert T. Miller, Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Kobayashi Maru: The Place of the 
Trans Union Case in the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
65, 70 n.3 (2017) (collecting sources). Because the court determined that directors did not benefit 
from the business judgment rule, it remanded, and the case settled. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858, 893 (Del. 1985).; WILLIAM M. OWEN, AUTOPSY OF A MERGER 261 (1986).
205. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881, 888 (“We conclude that Trans Union’s Board was grossly 
negligent in that it failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation in agreeing to the Pritzker 
merger proposal on September 20 . . . . [W]e hold that the defendants’ post-September conduct did 
not cure the deficiencies of their September 20 conduct.”).
206. Id. at 865-67; see OWEN, supra note 204, at 206 (“Jay Pritzker makes the deals . . . and 
Robert Pritzker runs the companies afterwards.”). Throughout the article, “Pritzker” includes the 
family and any entity controlled by the family.
207. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866 (“Van Gorkom then reviewed with Pritzker his calcula-
tions based upon his proposed price of $55 per share. Although Pritzker mentioned $50 as a more 
attractive figure, no other price was mentioned.”).
208. Id. at 867; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2017).
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documents regarding the contemplated transaction.209 After a single, two-hour 
meeting, the board approved the agreement negotiated by Van Gorkom.210 Al-
most five months later, during which time no suitors made an offer superior to 
that offered by Pritzker, Trans Union submitted the proposed transaction to 
shareholders, and immediately after their approval, the merger was consummat-
ed.211  When a shareholder challenged the transaction, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that the board was not entitled to the benefits of the business judg-
ment rule because the board was grossly negligent in informing itself regarding 
the transaction.212
In reaching that conclusion, the court proceeded in two steps.213  First, it 
addressed the actions that the board took, and failed to take, when the board au-
thorized entry into the proposed merger agreement.  Second, because the merger 
agreement could not be consummated immediately, the court also focused on 
the board’s post-signing actions to determine whether the board became ade-
quately informed, notwithstanding its initial failure to be adequately informed.
1.
The court focused on what occurred, and what did not occur, at that single 
two-hour meeting.  First, the court noted that the board had not been consider-
ing a sale of the company, and when Van Gorkom gave the board notice one 
day before the special meeting, the notice did not include the purpose of the 
meeting.214 The single meeting, at which the board decided to sell the corpora-
tion for approximately $690 million, lasted only two hours.215 The board was 
not provided documentation regarding the transaction prior to that single, two-
hour meeting, and was not provided time to review the limited documentation 
that it received during the meeting.216 Having not reviewed any documents, the 
board placed heavy reliance on Van Gorkom’s twenty-minute presentation.217
Unfortunately, Van Gorkom had not read the merger agreement, so the board’s 
209. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
210. Id. at 869.
211. The board originally approved the merger agreement at a meeting on September 20, 
1980, id., and the merger was consummated on February 10, 1981, OWEN, supra note 204, at 205, 
208.
212. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888, 890–91.
213. Id. at 874.
214. Id.; cf. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989) (dis-
tinguishing Van Gorkom, and finding no Revlon violation, where the “[B]oard . . . had been consid-
ering the possibility that the company would be sold for two years prior to receipt of Gould’s unso-
licited first proposal.”).
215. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874; cf. Citron, 569 A.2d at 67 (noting that the board dis-
cussed “the sale of the company at three separate board meetings over the course of three weeks”); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Del. 1989) (“Over the following 
eight days, Time’s board met three times to discuss Paramount’s $175 offer.”).
216. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868, n.7. 
217. Id. at 868-69.
Spring 2019] Unintentional Irony 203
reliance on him was misplaced.218 The court emphasized that boards should be 
active participants in any discussion regarding a significant transaction,219 and 
that, if the board had asked questions of Van Gorkom, the board would have 
realized that he had not read the agreement and that their reliance upon him had 
been unreasonable.220 Finally, the board agreed to a price without receipt of 
guidance that the price offered was good for shareholders.221 Although the con-
tract price of $55 represented a significant premium over the price at which the 
stock was trading in the market, all agreed that any acquirer would have to pay
a premium over the price at which the stock was trading in the market.222 The 
issue became the appropriateness of the offered premium (the “intrinsic value” 
of the company).  According to the court, the board should have requested in-
formation regarding “intrinsic value” from a corporate insider or a non-
employee expert.223 The board did hear from an insider, but he opined regard-
ing the price at which a leveraged acquisition might be financed, not regarding 
the corporation’s “intrinsic value” or the fairness of the offered consideration.224
The corporation had retained a non-employee expert, but the expert did not of-
fer an opinion to the board regarding the offered consideration during the meet-
ing.225 The fact that, during the board meeting, the expert was available by 
phone, but never contacted, did not comfort the court.226 If the board learned 
that the contract price resulted from aggressive negotiations, then the board 
might have been informed regarding the price;227 however, there was virtually 
no negotiations between Van Gorkom and Pritzker regarding the price.  Regard-
218. Id. at 875.
219. See id. at 872 (referencing an “affirmative duty . . . to proceed with a critical eye in as-
sessing information”). But see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (arguing in 
favor of director passivity and empowerment of shareholders). See generally Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, A Kindler, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96 NW.
U.L. REV. 595, 597 (2002) (referencing active consideration by directors).
220. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
221. Id. at 875–78.
222. Id. at 876. Although the court gave the premium of almost fifty percent little weight, it 
was high for that period. See Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why
Van Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 631, 638 (2002) (“[F]rom 1980 to 1985 the 
average premium was 30 percent”).  
223. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2017); cf. Citron, 569 A.2d at 67 (“The board, also 
in contrast with the Trans Union board, received investment advice from four leading investment 
banking firms, [and] commissioned financial evaluations by three of them. . . . ”).
224. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877.
225. Id. at 878.
226. See id.
227. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 693 (Del. Ch. 2001) (reject-
ing shareholders’ claim that the board failed to secure the best value, where, “[a]lthough the board 
negotiated with a single bidder, it bargained hard . . . .”).
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less of whether the board reached an informed decision at the initial board meet-
ing,228 the focus here is upon the post-signing market check.
2.
Even if the board was grossly negligent in informing itself at the initial two-
hour meeting, the board’s subsequent actions could have cured its initial failure 
to be adequately informed.229 However, the court concluded that those actions, 
including the post-signing market check, failed to cure the breach of fiduciary 
duty.230
A “market check” involves checking the contract price against any offers 
that other market participants would be willing to pay to acquire the corpora-
tion.231 In Van Gorkom, there was time to conduct a market check prior to the 
contemplated merger because corporate law generally requires a temporal delay 
between an agreement to merge and the consummation of the merger.  As an 
analogy, there is commonly a delay between the time that a couple agrees to 
marry and the time that they marry.  Such a delay was necessary in Van 
Gorkom, because, even if the board approved the transaction with Pritzker, the 
shareholders of the corporation would have to vote on the proposed merger,232
so, a future shareholder meeting would have to be convened,233 and a disclosure 
document drafted and circulated to shareholders prior to that meeting.234 The 
effectiveness of a market check may hinge on various factors, some of which 
are addressed in Part II.C.  In Van Gorkom, the court focused on the board ini-
tially agreeing not to shop Pritzker’s offer (the “no-shop”), and when the 
agreement was amended to permit the board to solicit competing bids (the “go 
shop”), concluding that the market check was not consistent with the board’s 
duty to be informed.235 According to the court, the amended agreement asked 
too much of the competing bidders (who were not expected simply to make a 
superior offer, but who were required to enter into a definitive agreement re-
garding that superior offer, which could not be subject to a financing condition) 
and gave too little time to accomplish what was required.236 According to the 
228. See Miller, supra note 204, at 70 n.3 (collecting sources in which many commentators 
argue that the board was informed).
229. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888; Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in Man-
agement Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 592 (2016) (“The ‘market-check’ process is generally 
viewed as an important protection to ensure that existing shareholders receive fair value.”).
230. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888.
231. See Subramanian, supra note 229, at 592.
232. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2017).
233. Id. § 211.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (2012); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (discussing shareholder 
proxies).
235. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888.
236. Id. at 885–87.
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court, the amendments foreclosed Trans Union and the board from effectively 
conducting a post-signing market check.237
Regarding the market check, the court discussed two bidders—Kohlberg, 
Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR) & General Electric Credit Corporation 
(GECC).238 KKR joined with existing managers of Trans Union to propose a 
management buy-out (MBO).239 KKR offered $60 per share, but its offer was 
subject to a financing condition.240 Regardless, KKR withdrew the offer only 
three hours after it was made, when one of the corporation’s existing managers 
withdrew from the group.241 GECC did not develop interest in the corporation 
until November, never made a formal proposal, and stated that it believed that it 
could make a superior proposal if given two-to-three months more to investigate 
and confirm its valuation.242 GECC’s requested extension would have required 
Pritzker’s consent to delay the Trans Union meeting at which shareholders
would vote on Pritzker’s proposal.  When Pritzker denied an extension, GECC 
terminated negotiations.243 Again, the court concluded that the amended 
agreement with Pritzker rendered the market check “virtually meaningless” and 
failed to cure the board’s deficient information-gathering process.244
B.
In Van Gorkom, the analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court regarding the 
post-signing market check was internally inconsistent and unintentionally iron-
ic.  Moreover, given subsequent developments regarding post-signing market 
checks, the Van Gorkom decision appears even more ironic.
1.
The court concluded that, during the post-signing market check, the board 
lacked the time necessary to negotiate a definitive agreement regarding a supe-
rior offer, and that any superior bidder would lack the time necessary to arrange 
financing.245 However, those conclusions are ironic, given that the post-signing 
237. Id.
238. See id. at 884–85.
239. Id. at 884.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 885 (noting the court’s suggestion that Van Gorkom prompted that manager’s
withdraw from the MBO group).  But see OWEN, supra note 204, at 146 (noting a Trans Union in-
sider’s contradiction of the court’s assertion regarding the manager’s withdrawal).
242. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885; OWEN, supra note 204, at 166.
243. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 884 (questioning the “feasibility” of the market-check because “Trans Union could 
accept from a third party a better offer only if it were incorporated in a definitive agreement be-
tween the parties, and not conditioned on financing or on any other contingency”); id. at 885 
(“[The] market test was virtually meaningless in the face of the terms and time limitations of Trans 
Union’s Merger Agreement with Pritzker as amended . . . .”).  Note that the time required for the 
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market check allowed much more time for negotiation and to arrange financing 
than was required by Pritzker.  One week passed between the initial foray be-
tween Van Gorkom and Pritzker (September 13, 1980) and the execution of 
their definitive merger agreement (September 20, 1980).246 Less than one 
month passed between the time that Pritzker learned of the possibility of acquir-
ing Trans Union (September 13, 1980) and the time that he arranged financing 
of $600 million to acquire the corporation (October 9, 1980).247
In Van Gorkom, the post-signing market check ran almost five months.  Po-
tential bidders learned that Trans Union was for sale on September 22, 1980, the 
date of the public announcement regarding the deal with Pritzker.248 The period 
of the market check effectively ended on February 10, 1981, the date of the 
meeting at which Trans Union’s shareholders voted on the deal with Pritzker,249
which was also the date on which the merger was consummated.250 The post-
signing market check period ran more than four-and-a-half months, or, to round 
down, four months.251
The court’s analysis improperly shortened that four-month time frame from 
both ends.  According to the court, the market check period did not begin until 
October 10, 1980, when the agreement was amended to permit the solicitation 
of competing bids.252 Between September 22 (the date of the public announce-
ment) and October 10 (the date of the amendments), during which time Trans 
Union was subject to a no shop, 253 an implicit market check was on-going.  
Though Trans Union could not solicit higher bids, Trans Union could consider 
unsolicited higher bids.  The court misapprehended the aggressiveness with 
which individuals in the M&A realm operate.  Once Trans Union publicly an-
nounced that it agreed to be acquired, potential acquirers felt invited to make 
competing bids;254 they are the “least bashful people in the investment busi-
board to become informed regarding a transaction agreement is independent of the time required for 
the principals to negotiate the agreement and for the bidder to arrange financing.
246. Id. at 866, 869. 
247. Id. at 866, 870; see OWEN, supra note 204, at 196–97 (listing lenders and amounts).
248. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869.
249. Id. at 883.
250. OWEN, supra note 204, at 205, 208 (referencing the merger date and the closing date); 
see Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops v. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implica-
tions, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 735 (2008) (referencing the closing of the transaction as the end of the go-
shop period). 
251. Miller, supra note 204, at 178 (referring to the “four-month go-shop period”).
252. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 883.
253. A no shop bars a corporation, its directors and officers, and its advisors from soliciting 
competing bids, but generally permits the corporation to respond to unsolicited competing bids. Ac-
cord OWEN, supra note 204, at 74 (noting that TU’s board retained the right to provide a third-party 
suitor the same sort of information provided to Pritzker, as well as other reasonably-requested in-
formation).  
254. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 879 (noting, but disagreeing, that “the entire financial com-
munity would know that Trans Union was for sale upon the announcement of the Pritzker offer, and 
anyone desiring to make a better offer was free to do so”).
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ness,” rendering unimportant whether Trans Union was subject to a “no-
shop.”255 Regardless, on October 10, the agreement permitted Trans Union to 
shop for higher bids, and it did so.256 The court unconvincingly tried to shorten 
the market-check period on the front end; equally unavailing was its attempt to 
shorten the market-check period on the back-end.
According to the court, the market-check period did not run until February 
10, 1981, but was effectively “circumscribed by other amendments which re-
quired Trans Union to file its preliminary proxy statement regarding the Pritzker 
merger proposal by December 5, 1980 and use its best efforts to mail the state-
ment to its shareholders by January 5, 1981.”257 Those December and January 
dates are red herrings.  Whether in December or January, Trans Union could 
have negotiated a transaction regarding a superior bid, not subject to financing, 
and then Trans Union could have terminated its agreement with Pritzker, can-
celled the shareholder meeting scheduled on February 10, 1981, and solicited 
proxies for a new shareholders meeting to address the negotiated agreement re-
garding the superior bid.258 While it would be expensive and wasteful to notice 
a shareholder meeting and distribute proxy statements,259 only to cancel the 
meeting,  the directors would do so only in pursuit of a transaction that would 
leave shareholders in a better financial position.260 The court also referred to 
the agreement establishing the end of the go shop period at February 1,261 not 
255. OWEN, supra note 204, at 73; see id. at 74. See generally In re Topps Co. S’holders 
Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 85 (Del. Ch. 2007) (referencing “ravenous capitalists”); In re Toys R Us, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006-07 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The M & A market, as [plaintiffs] view it, 
is comprised of buyers of exceedingly modest and retiring personality, too genteel to make even the 
politest of uninvited overtures: a cotillion of the reticent. . . . I begin by noting my disagreement 
with the plaintiffs about the nature of players in the American M & A markets. They are not like 
some of us were in high school. They have no problem with rejection. The great takeover cases of 
the last quarter century—like Unocal, QVC, and—oh, yeah—Revlon—all involved bidders who 
were prepared, for financial advantage, to make hostile, unsolicited bids. Over the years, that will-
ingness has not gone away.”).
256. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 883; OWEN, supra note 204, at 120, 122 (noting that Salomon 
Brothers—an investment bank—initially screened hundreds of companies, before compiling a list of 
100 potential bidders, and eventually contacted those 100 potential bidders).
257. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 883.  A preliminary proxy statement—which is a disclosure 
document that would enable shareholders to cast an informed vote at the shareholder meeting on 
February 10—would be filed with the SEC well in advance of that meeting.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) 
(2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2018).  The SEC might require that Trans Union amend the proxy 
statement.  See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2018) (barring the solicitation of proxies by mate-
rially misleading statements).  Following any amendments and updates, Trans Union would then 
send the definitive proxy statement to shareholders.  
258. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888 (“[T]he Board’s only ground for release from its agree-
ment with Pritzker was its entry into a more favorable definitive agreement to sell the Company to a 
third party.”).
259. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 101, at 66 (“Because voting is ex-
pensive, the participants in the venture will arrange to conserve on its use.”).
260. See generally Time Inc., 571 A.2d (Del. 1989) (cancelling shareholder meeting for which 
proxies had been solicited).
261. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870.
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the date of the shareholder meeting and merger, February 10.  However, what if, 
between February 1 and 10, a third party came forward with a fully-financed 
superior offer?  Van Gorkom suggested that the transaction agreement could in-
fringe on directors’ fiduciary duties, but subsequent decisions have reached a 
contrary conclusion.262 Regardless, if, in early February, a superior proposal 
was available, then, at the February 10 meeting, the shareholders likely would 
have voted against the inferior offer of Pritzker, rendering unnecessary the 
board’s authority to terminate the agreement between February 1 and 10.  Even 
in early February, the market would continue to provide a check on the price 
offered by Pritzker.
So, the post-signing market check period ran at least four months.  Four
months may not seem like a lengthy period, but in the realm of M&A, speed is 
critical.263 The four-month post-signing market check dwarfed the time neces-
sary for Pritzker to reach a definitive agreement (one week) and arrange financ-
ing (one month).  Though every transaction is unique,264 and though lengthy 
negotiation-and-financing periods are common, the Delaware courts repeatedly 
have analyzed sizeable transactions in which the parties reached a definitive 
agreement in less than four months and arranged financing in that amount of 
time.265 Set forth below is a sampling of those transactions:
262. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003) (requiring a “fi-
duciary out”); see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 
1993) (requiring a fiduciary out). According to Van Gorkom, a “board’s compliance with its fiduci-
ary duties is judged at the time it approves a merger agreement, and a board’s ability to act subse-
quently in response to post-contracting events is governed by the terms of the merger agreement, 
not by generalized concepts of fiduciary duty.” F. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Deal-
Protection Measures and the Merger Recommendation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (2002).  
Note that, in subsequent developments, the Delaware courts have held that directors cannot enter 
into an agreement that requires them to breach their fiduciary duties.  QVC, 637 A.2d at 51; cf. Wil-
liam T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 
BUS. L. 653, 659 (2000) (suggesting QVC gave too little credit to the contract rights of the bidder).
263. There’s a reason that Wall Street lawyers and bankers work long hours. See In re Formi-
ca Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 10598, 1989 WL 25812, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (referencing 
“three days . . . of round-the-clock, intensive negotiations”); OWEN, supra note 204, at 64–65 (illus-
trating how parties race to reach an agreement because, in part, leaks may jeopardize their deal, ex-
acerbated by the risk of insider trading). See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) 
(noting that delay may jeopardize a transaction).
264. Balotti & Sparks, supra note 262, at 474 (footnote omitted) (“[W]hen a deal-protection 
measure is ultimately reviewed by a Delaware court,it almost certainly will be in the context of a 
highly contextual, fact-intensive analysis. Thus, while it is possible to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of arguments for or against a particular mechanism, the ultimate validity of the measure 
is virtually impossible to predict in the abstract. Moreover, the overarching obligation of the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery to do equity in a given scenario means that, at times, nuanced legal theories 
and doctrinal niceties may be disregarded (and appropriately so) to address the equities of a particu-
lar case.”).
265. As mentioned above, the board members would have to fulfill their fiduciary duties re-
garding any transaction agreements, but the time required for the board members to fulfill their du-
ties is independent of the time required by the parties to reach those agreements.  
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Pennaco Energy, Inc.: In a $500 million transaction,266 the parties exe-
cuted a confidentiality agreement on November 15, 2000, and executed 
a definitive transaction agreement the following month, on December 
22, 2000.267
Cogent, Inc.: Though due diligence had been on-going for some time, 
the parties—following the bidder’s submission of a non-binding pro-
posal on July 2, 2010—reached a definitive agreement in less than two 
months on August 29, 2010,268 in a transaction that valued Cogent at 
$430 million.269
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.: After their initial meeting on May 
1, 1979, the parties entered into a definitive transaction agreement on 
May 19, 1979,270 in a transaction valued at $365 million.271
Revlon, Inc.: In response to a hostile proposal on August 14, 1985, 
Revlon initiated negotiations with a favored bidder and reached an 
agreement in less than two months, on October 3, 1985,272 in a transac-
tion valued at more than $1.5 billion.273
J.P Stevens & Co., Inc.: The bidder learned of the possibility of acquir-
ing J.P. Stevens upon announcement that it was for sale on February 9, 
1988, and, five weeks later, the parties entered into a definitive transac-
tion agreement on March 14, 1998,274 in a deal valued at $1.2 billion.275
BioClinica, Inc.: In a $123 million transaction, the parties executed a 
confidentiality agreement in mid-October 2012, the bidder’s first offer 
occurred on November 14, 2012, leading to a definitive agreement exe-
cuted on January 29, 2013.276
Macmillan, Inc.: In a multi-billion-dollar deal, KKR initiated discus-
sions regarding an MBO on July 14, 1988, and the parties entered a de-
266. Susie Cruz, Marathon to Buy Pennaco Energy for $500 Million, OIL & GAS JOURNAL
(Dec. 26, 2000), https://www.ogj.com/articles/2000/12/marathon-to-buy-pennaco-energy-for-500-
million.html.
267. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 698, 702 (Del. Ch. 2001).
268. In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 492-94 (Del. Ch. 2010).
269. Id. at 502 (reporting an equity value of $943 million, but an enterprise value of $430 
million). 
270. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 60–63 (Del. 1989).
271. Charlotte Evans, Schlumberger Reports a Plan to Acquire Fairchild, N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 1979, at 30.
272. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176–78 (Del. 
1986).
273. Todd S. Purdum, Forstmann Raises Bid for Revlon, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 1985), at B1, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/14/business/forstmann-raises-bid-for-revlon.html.
274. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 772-76 (Del. Ch. 1988).
275. Robert J. Cole, 3-Month Battle for J.P. Stevens Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1988, at D1.
276. In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *2-3 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 16, 2013).
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finitive transaction agreement two months later, on September 11, 
1988.277
As a contrast to the four-month period of Van Gorkom, a Delaware court ex-
pressed skepticism that a forty-five-day period was sufficient for the emergence 
of a competing bidder, investigation by that bidder, and execution of a defini-
tive agreement.278
Noting again that transactions are unique, and that longer periods to secure 
financing commonly occur, Delaware cases indicate that a bidder may arrange 
financing to consummate the contemplated transaction in less than four months:
Formica Corp.: In a $365 million transaction,279 Formica and financial 
bidder Dillon Read entered into a confidentiality agreement on Novem-
ber 1, 1988, and Dillon Read had arranged financing approximately 
three months later, on February 2, 1989.280
J.P Stevens & Co., Inc.: The bidder learned of the possibility of acquir-
ing J.P. Stevens upon announcement that it was for sale on February 9, 
1988, and the bidder had arranged financing in three months, during 
April 1988,281 in a deal valued at $1.2 billion.282
Revlon, Inc.: In response to a hostile proposal on August 14, 1985, 
Revlon initiated negotiations with a favored bidder, who arranged fi-
nancing in less than two months, by October 12, 1985,283 in a transac-
tion valued at more than $1.5 billion.284
Macmillan, Inc.: In a multi-billion-dollar deal, KKR initiated discus-
sions regarding an MBO on July 14, 1988, and had arranged financing 
within two months.285
In Van Gorkom, Pritzker agreed to acquire Trans Union and quickly arranged 
financing,286 in the fall of 1980, which was at the beginning of a decade-long 
merger wave.  During that decade, money flowed freely; and KKR—which was 
trying to outbid Pritzker—secured lots of it.287
277. Mills v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1272-75 (Del. 1989).
278. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 119–20 (Del. Ch. 2007) (referencing also 
the expiration of match rights).  
279. See Formica to Go Ahead with Management Takeout, UPI (Apr. 13, 1989) , 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/04/13/Formica-to-go-ahead-with-management-
takeout/5339608443200/.
280. In re Formica Corp. S’holders Litig., No 10598, 1989 WL 25812, at *4–5 (Del Ch. Mar. 
22, 1989).
281. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 772-73 (Del. Ch. 1988).
282. Cole, supra note 275, at D1.
283. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176–79 (Del. 
1986).
284. See Purdum, supra note 273, at B1.
285. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1272–75 (Del. 1989) (ref-
erencing conditions to KKR’s offer, but making no mention of a financing condition).
286. OWEN, supra note 204, at 196–97.
287. KKR had arranged financing of $800 million for three deals in the weeks before it pur-
sued Trans Union. OWEN, supra note 204, at 123.
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Beatrice Cos.: In August 1985, KKR learned that Beatrice might be a 
willing target following the ouster of its chief executive officer, who had 
rebuffed earlier acquisition attempts.288 By December 20, 1985, KKR 
had organized $4 billion in financing to consummate the $6.2 billion 
transaction, even though other stages of the acquisition would take an 
additional four months.289
Safeway Stores, Inc.: In July 1986, over the course of four days, KKR 
received financing commitments of $6 billion, even though it sought on-
ly $3 billion, to acquire the grocery store chain.290
Owens-Illinois Inc.: In February 1987, there was a “stampede by eager 
lenders” to provide more than $3 billion to KKR to finance the acquisi-
tion of “America’s largest glass container company.”291 Lenders offered 
over $7 billion to finance the deal, and KKR turned away over $4 bil-
lion.292
Just as KKR required lots of financing to consummate its deals; Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc. organized the financing for lots of deals, including many 
KKR deals during the mid-to-late 1980s.293  “With a single visit to [Drexel’s 
Los Angeles office, where Michael Milken worked], corporate raiders [and] 
buyout specialists . . . could pick up vast amounts of money . . . .”294
Cole National Corp.: KKR had arranged financing of $318 million to 
acquire Cole, but a lender and its $100 million commitment unexpected-
ly dropped out.295 KKR received a commitment from Drexel for the 
$100 million shortfall in a single meeting.296
According to Milken, “Money isn’t the scarce resource. Human capital 
is.”297 Because four months repeatedly has proven adequate for motivated par-
ties to reach a definitive agreement and arrange financing, the court’s bald as-
sertion to the contrary appears incorrect and is ironic given that Pritzker re-
quired only one week to reach an agreement and one month to arrange 
financing.  And, shifting from the facts to the law, four months would be more 
than adequate for a board of directors to follow the Van Gorkom landmarks of 
becoming adequately informed—e.g., multiple, long meetings; receipt of a fair-
ness opinion; and active question-and-answer sessions with advisors.298
288. GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT: KKR AND THE MORTGAGING OF AMERICAN 
BUSINESS 68 (1992).
289. Id. at 71–73.
290. Id. at 77–78.
291. Id. at 81.
292. Id.
293. Id. at xviii. 
294. Id. at 82.
295. Id. at 88–89.
296. Id. at 89.
297. Id. at 97.
298. Cf. Citron, 569 A.2d at 67 (distinguishing Van Gorkom, and finding no Revlon violation, 
where the “board . . . had been considering the possibility that the company would be sold for two 
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C.
Subsequent legal developments impact how one might view the market 
check of Van Gorkom.  Certain legal developments lessen the demands on di-
rectors from those demands recognized in Van Gorkom, and those develop-
ments are addressed in Part C.1.  Other legal developments effectively increase 
the demands on directors from those demands recognized in Van Gorkom, and 
those developments are addressed in Part C.2.  Retroactive application of those 
more-demanding developments indicate that, if reviewed today, the post-
signing market check employed by Trans Union’s board would survive en-
hanced scrutiny, leaving the conclusion of the Van Gorkom court even more 
ironic.299
1.
Two subsequent legal developments—one statutory and one common-
law—effectively lessened the demands on directors recognized in Van Gorkom.
Following Van Gorkom, directors faced a new threat of personal liability.  Giv-
en that threat of personal liability, some were concerned that talented individu-
als would refuse to serve as directors of Delaware corporations.  Moreover, the 
rates for director-and-officer insurance increased significantly.300 The Dela-
ware legislature responded by enacting a provision that permitted the elimina-
tion of director liability for monetary damages to the corporation or sharehold-
ers for the breach of the duty of care, which was the duty at issue in Van 
Gorkom.301 The statutory provision—Section 102(b)(7)—is not self-executing.  
A corporation’s certificate of incorporation must include language permitted by 
Section 102(b)(7) for its directors to benefit.  Inclusion in the certificate of in-
corporation means that shareholders expressly or implicitly approve of forego-
ing monetary damage claims of the sort at issue in Van Gorkom.302 Delaware 
certificates of incorporation now routinely include director-protection language 
years prior to receipt of [an] unsolicited first proposal. The board, also in contrast with the Trans 
Union board, received investment advice from four leading investment banking firms, commis-
sioned financial evaluations by three of them, shopped the company to roughly 75 potential buyers, 
and discussed the sale of the company at three separate board meetings over the course of three 
weeks.”).
299. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 1, at 459 n.39 (“[T]he broad market check conducted 
by the board in Van Gorkom would have satisfied its Revlon duties.”). That article was authored by 
three Delaware jurists writing in their individual capacities. At that time, Allen was a former Chan-
cellor; Jacobs was a former Vice Chancellor and a former Justice; and Strine was a Vice Chancellor 
and currently is Chief Justice.  
300. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1155–60 (1990).
301. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017).
302. Shareholders must expressly approve of any such amendment to the certificate of incor-
poration. Id. § 242.  If the certificate of incorporation includes such director-protection language at 
the time that the shareholder acquires her shares, then she implicitly approves of that language.
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permitted by Section 102(b)(7).303 The protections afforded by Section 
102(b)(7), however, have limits.  Section 102(b)(7) does not permit the elimina-
tion of monetary damages in favor of the corporation or shareholders against 
any director that breaches the duty of loyalty or good faith.  Moreover, Section 
102(b)(7) does not prohibit injunctive relief.
Second, in Lyondell, which post-dated Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme 
Court addressed the impact of a charter provision permitted by Section 
102(b)(7) when the board agreed to sell the corporation, which occurred in Van 
Gorkom.  For summary judgment purposes, the Chancery Court concluded that, 
in approving that sale, the board was not sufficiently knowledgeable when it 
“never conducted a formal pre-signing market check to determine whether a 
better price could be obtained . . . , was not able to negotiate successfully for a 
post-signing go-shop period and . . . did nothing post-signing to confirm that a 
better price could not have been obtained.”304 On appeal, the Delaware Su-
preme Court reversed,305 because the corporation’s charter included language 
permitted by Section 102(b)(7), because the shareholder raised no issues of loy-
alty or good faith, and because the shareholder did not seek equitable relief as 
the merger had already been consummated.306 According to the Delaware Su-
preme Court, “[a]t most, [the] record create[d] a triable issue of fact on the 
question of whether the directors exercised due care,”307 but that claim was not 
cognizable.  Given the prevalence of charter provisions permitted by Section 
102(b)(7) and Lyondell, courts now typically focus upon loyalty and good faith 
when the board sells the corporation.  A breach of the duty of good faith re-
quires an intent to harm or the conscious disregard of a known duty to act, ei-
ther of which is less demanding of directors than the principles set forth in Van 
Gorkom.308
2.
While some subsequent legal developments lessened the demands on direc-
tors in situations like Van Gorkom, other legal developments increased the de-
mands on directors in situations like Van Gorkom.  When the board agrees to a 
transaction that presents the shareholders with the last opportunity to collect a 
control premium, the board must act reasonably, gathering information and 
303. See, e.g., Facebook, Certificate of Incorporation art. VII (Oct. 1, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/TH82-TRWC.
304. Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
305. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 237.
306. Lyondell, 2008 WL 29223427, at *1 n.4 (“The Merger has occurred and the Court cannot 
undo it.  Ryan did not seek any interim equitable relief.”).
307. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 237.
308. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 62-67 (Del. 2006).
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maximizing the consideration to be received by shareholders.309 These so-
called Revlon duties demand more of directors than did Van Gorkom in two sig-
nificant respects.  First, while the business judgment rule at issue in Van 
Gorkom demands that the board act rationally, Revlon demands that the board 
act reasonably.310 “Although linguistically not obvious, this reasonableness re-
view is more searching than rationality review, and there is less tolerance for 
slack by the directors.”311 Second, in Van Gorkom, the shareholder bore the 
burden of proving the board acted with gross negligence in informing itself.312
Conversely, after the shareholder proves that Revlon duties are implicated, the 
“directors have the burden of proving that they were adequately informed and 
acted reasonably.”313
The Delaware Supreme Court decided in Revlon in 1986, after Van Gorkom
in 1985.  Although Revlon duties could not have been directly implicated in Van 
Gorkom, the Pritzker transaction resulted in shareholders being cashed out, 
which is a transaction that presented shareholder with the last opportunity to 
collect a control premium.314 Thus, if Van Gorkom had been decided after 
Revlon, then the directors of Trans Union would have been subject to Revlon
duties.  In fact, courts and commentators consider Van Gorkom as an initial at-
tempt to describe what became known as Revlon duties, as the Delaware courts 
struggled to address the legal issues arising in the increasingly frenetic era of 
friendly-and-hostile acquisitions.315
Recent judicial interpretations by the Delaware courts indicate that the post-
signing market check employed by Trans Union’s board would have survived 
the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon.  That is, if a court retroactively applied Revlon
to the facts of Van Gorkom, the court likely would conclude that the board ful-
filled its fiduciary duties.316 Such a conclusion proves both dramatic and ironic 
309. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 185 (Del. 
1986); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1993); see Miller, 
supra note 204, at 195 (“[A] board’s Revlon duties include the Van Gorkom duty of care . . . .”).
310. Cf. Unitrin Inc., v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995) (“The first 
aspect of the Unocal burden . . . required the board to demonstrate . . . a reasonable investiga-
tion . . . . ”); QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
311. In re NetSmart Technologies, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d, 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
see In re Toys R Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005).
312. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985).
313. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
314. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig.,, 926 A.2d 58, 64 (Del Ch. 2007) (“The so-called 
Revlon standard is equally familiar. When directors propose to sell a company for cash . . . , they 
must take reasonable measures to ensure that the stockholders receive the highest value reasonably 
attainable.”).
315. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 602 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Van 
Gorkom, after all, was really a Revlon case.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988) (arguing that Van Gorkom is better viewed as 
a takeover case, which presages Revlon, rather than a simple business-judgement-rule case).
316. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 1, at 459 n.39 (“[T]he  broad  market  check  con-
ducted  by  the  board  in  Van Gorkom would have satisfied its Revlon duties.”); see also Bernard 
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 
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as it reveals that the board could carry its burden that it acted reasonably, when 
the Van Gorkom court concluded that the shareholder carried his burden that the 
board was grossly negligent in informing itself.
When reviewing transaction agreements, Delaware courts generally find 
that boards have fulfilled their fiduciary duties, when no superior bid emerges 
following a post-signing market check,317 so long as bidders have information, 
time to digest that information, and any deal protection that favors the initial 
bidder does not preclude a superior bid.318
a.
First, it may seem advisable for the board to canvass the market for the best 
offer, then negotiate with the bidder offering the highest price, and then enter 
into an agreement with that bidder.319 However, the Delaware courts have con-
cluded that, rather than canvass-then-sign, board members may fulfill their fi-
duciary obligations, even if the target negotiated a transaction agreement with a 
single bidder, and, after signing that agreement, canvassed the market.320
NW. U.L. REV. 521, 525 (2002) (“[T]he sale process was subject to a serious market check for 
whether someone else might pay more, including an effort by Trans Union’s investment bankers to 
seek potential buyers.”).
317. Miller, supra note 204, at 180–81 (footnote omitted) (Aside from failures of disclosure, 
“in the more than thirty years since Revlon, . . . the Delaware courts have never enjoined a transac-
tion because the board had violated its Revlon duties, except when there had emerged another bidder 
who appeared to be willing to offer a superior price . . . .”); see Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 
A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (“[W]hen it is widely known that some change of control is in the of-
fing and no rival bids are forthcoming over an extended period of time, that fact is supportive of the 
board’s decision to proceed.”); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(quoting Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 293 (Del. Ch. 1998)) 
(“[T]he fact that no higher bid has come forth in these circumstances is itself “evidence that the di-
rectors, in fact, obtained the highest and best transaction reasonably available. . . . The failure of any 
potential competitor to make a proposal . . . is evidence that the directors, in fact, obtained the high-
est and best transaction reasonably available.”).  
318. See generally Balotti & Sparks, supra note 262, at 474 (footnote omitted) (“[W]hen a 
deal-protection measure is ultimately reviewed by a Delaware court, it almost certainly will be in 
the context of a highly contextual, fact-intensive analysis. Thus, while it is possible to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of arguments for or against a particular mechanism, the ultimate validity 
of the measure is virtually impossible to predict in the abstract. Moreover, the overarching obliga-
tion of the Delaware Court of Chancery to do equity in a given scenario means that, at times, nu-
anced legal theories and doctrinal niceties may be disregarded (and appropriately so) to address the 
equities of a particular case.”).
319. See, e.g., Barkan 567 A.2d 1288 (Del. 1989) (“[A] judicious market survey might have 
been desirable, since it would have made it clear beyond question that the board was acting to pro-
tect the shareholder’s interests.”); see also Miller, supra note 204, at 176 (“[A] passive market 
check performed after a deal is signed may in general be the least effective kind of market 
check . . . .”); Subramanian, supra note 250, at 734 (generally favoring pre-signing market check, 
rather than a post-signing go shop, in MBOs). 
320. See generally Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287 (“When the board is considering a single offer 
and has no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness demands a 
canvas of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited.”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder 
Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 575–76 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting Revlon challenge where targeted corporation 
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Revlon requires that the board act reasonably, not perfectly,321 and it may be 
reasonable for the board to sign-then-canvass.  For example, a board may be 
“worried that a failed [pre-signing] public auction could damage the company, 
including by distracting and creating anxiety among company employees.”322
In Van Gorkom, managers were distracted and anxious upon learning of Pritz-
ker’s planned acquisition of Trans Union.323 The concerns of those managers 
were addressed when Pritzker agreed to retain their services for six months if 
Pritzker ultimately acquired Trans Union.324 Absent another impediment of the 
sort discussed in the following subsections, a competing bidder could have 
topped Pritzker’s offer.325
b.
To offer a superior bid, a competing bidder requires information about the 
targeted corporation and time to analyze that information.  For example, a bid-
der would require additional time to consider the acquisition of a privately-held 
corporation relative to a publicly-traded corporation.326 A privately-held corpo-
ration may not have disclosed meaningful information to the market, and there 
would be no pre-existing market price for the stock of a privately-held corpora-
tion, whereas federal law requires publicly-traded corporations to disclose spec-
ified information,327 including financial statements,328 and the market utilizes 
did not conduct a pre-signing auction); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allen, No. 16301, 1998 WL 892631, 
at *17 n.16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that board can fulfill its Revlon duty to be informed by 
performing a pre-signing market check or a post-signing market check); In re Fort Howard Corp. 
S’holders Litig., No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (concluding that, in the 
context of an MBO, without a pre-signing auction, the post-signing market check “was effective to 
give the board an informed, dependable basis for the view that the Morgan Stanley offer is the best 
available transaction from the point of view of the Fort Howard shareholders”).
321. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1994).
322. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d at 576; see also In re MONY Grp. Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Single-bidder approaches offer the benefits of 
protecting against the risk that an auction will be a failed one, and avoiding a premature disclosure 
to the detriment of the company’s then-ongoing business.”).
323. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867 (Del. 1985).
324. See id. at 882 (“Van Gorkom then advised Senior Management that the Agreement 
would be amended to give Trans Union the right to solicit competing offers through January, 1981, 
if they would agree to remain with Trans Union. Senior Management was temporarily mollified.”).
325. See In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 693 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“Although the board 
negotiated with a single bidder, it bargained hard and made sure that the transaction was subject to a 
post-agreement market check unobstructed by onerous deal protection measures that would impede 
a topping bid”).  But see Miller, supra note 204, at 148–92 (arguing that the board could have se-
cured significantly more if it had canvassed-then-signed, instead of signed-then-canvassed).
326. A confidentiality agreement protects against a bidder’s misusage of non-public infor-
mation.  See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1211–13 (Del. 
2012).
327. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).
328. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K, https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-k.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2019).
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that information to establish a per-share trading price.  Shares of Trans Union 
were traded publicly,329 and its filings with the SEC were available to the pub-
lic, indicating that bidders would need less time to formulate a competing bid, 
relative to a privately-held company.
Even if the stock of the targeted corporation is traded publicly, a “micro-
cap” corporation may not be followed widely by market participants, indicating 
that additional time and selling efforts may be required during a market 
check.330 However, Trans Union was “widely followed by securities ana-
lysts,”331 and it was no “microcap.”  From 1960 through 1977, Trans Union ap-
peared in the Fortune 500.332 In 1977, Trans Union ranked 278 in that list, with 
revenues of $746 million, assets of $1.4 billion, and more than 10,000 employ-
ees.333 Moreover, Trans Union “had a cash flow of hundreds of millions of dol-
lars annually.”334 While the negotiated acquisition price of $690 million for 
Trans Union might seem relatively small today,335 one should account for the 
time value of money.  The negotiated deal value of $690 million for Trans Un-
ion in 1980 translates to $1.7 billion in 2007 (the time of the Netsmart and 
Topps acquisitions referenced in the accompanying notes) or $2.1 billion in 
2018.  As expanded upon in the next subsection, insufficient access to infor-
mation did not impede bidders’ pursuit of Trans Union during the post-signing 
market check.
c.
A bidder that enters into an acquisition contract with the targeted corpora-
tion recognizes that, given the passage of time between their agreement and the 
anticipated consummation of the contemplated transaction, another bidder may 
emerge and successfully acquire the targeted corporation.  The initial bidder 
may seek contractual protection to increase the likelihood of consummating its 
329. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864 (“Trans Union was . . . publicly-traded . . . .”). 
330. In re NetSmart Technologies, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d, 171, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(“[B]ecause of the various problems . . . attract[ing] market attention as a micro-cap public compa-
ny, an inert, implicit post-signing market check does not, on this record, suffice as a reliable way to 
survey interest by strategic players. Rather, to test the market for strategic buyers in a reliable fash-
ion, one would expect a material effort at salesmanship to occur.”).
331. Miller, supra note 204, at 176.
332. See A Database of 50 Years of Fortune’s List of America’s Largest Corporation, 
FORTUNE, http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/letters/T.html (last vis-
ited July 10, 2018).
333. Trans Union: 1977, Fortune500, A Database, FORTUNE (last visited July 10, 2018), 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/snapshots/1977/3612.html.
334. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
335. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 61 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Despite its house-
hold name, Topps is not a large public company.  Its market capitalization is less than a half billion 
dollars [in 2007].”). 
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acquisition of the targeted corporation (e.g., a “no shop”).336 The initial bidder 
may also seek contractual terms that compensate it for its time and efforts in 
identifying the targeted corporation and establishing a floor price for its acquisi-
tion (e.g., a termination fee or a stock option), if another bidder successfully ac-
quires the targeted corporation.337 Courts and commentators refer to such con-
tractual terms as “deal protection.”338
An initial bidder—who enters into a contract to acquire a targeted corpora-
tion—generally does not want the targeted corporation shopping for a higher 
bid: “We just got engaged.  Why are you hunting for another suitor?”339 Thus, 
the transaction contract commonly includes a no shop provision that bars the 
targeted corporation from soliciting offers from other bidders.  The original 
agreement between Pritzker and Trans Union included a no shop provision.340
A no shop provision may unduly limit the information available to the board of 
directors of the selling corporation and bar the directors’ fulfillment of their fi-
duciary obligations.341 While the original agreement with Pritzker barred Trans 
Union from soliciting competing offers, the parties understood that Trans Union 
could consider and respond to unsolicited competing offers.342 A so-called im-
plicit market check may be troubling if the targeted corporation is privately-held 
336. See J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 804  (2013) (“Deal 
protection devices are defensive measures deployed by a board unilaterally to protect a chosen 
transaction from interlopers during the period before the stockholder vote.”).
337. In re Toys R Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1015 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he first 
bidder has taken the risk, suffered the search and opportunity costs, and done the due diligence re-
quired to establish the bidding floor.”).
338. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003); Guhan Subra-
manian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013 (2017).
339. To use the M&A analogy, the contract bidder does not want to be the “stalking horse”
that enables another bidder to nab the prey.  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866 (noting that Pritzker did 
not want to be a “stalking horse”); OWEN, supra note 204, at 51 (defining a “stalking horse” as “a
horse a hunter hides behind while he stalks game”).
340. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867–68.
341. See Paramount Commc’n’s Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 n.20 (Del. 1994)
(“Whether or not [the no-shop provision] could validly have operated here at an early stage solely to 
prevent Paramount from actively ‘shopping’ the company, it could not prevent the Paramount direc-
tors from carrying out their fiduciary duties in considering unsolicited bids or in negotiating for the 
best value reasonably available to the stockholders.”); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 
1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) (“Where a board has no reasonable basis upon which to judge the adequacy 
of a contemplated transaction, a no-shop restriction gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to 
forestall competing bids.”). See generally Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., No. 
17398, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (noting that a board’s decision “not to 
negotiate . . . must be an informed one” and that a no-talk provision may be “the legal equivalent of 
willful blindness”).
342. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868 (Under the original agreement, “for a period of 90 
days, Trans Union could receive, but could not actively solicit, competing offers . . . .”); OWEN,
supra note 204, at 74 (noting that, though subject to a no-shop, the board retained the right to re-
spond to unsolicited offers and provide third-party bidders with the same information provided to 
Pritzker as well as other reasonably requested information). 
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or not widely-followed,343 but neither applied to Trans Union.  When Trans Un-
ion publicly announced its agreement with Pritzker, Trans Union effectively put 
up a “for sale” sign,344 and implicitly invited ravenous market participants to 
make unsolicited offers.345
Although the original agreement barred Trans Union from shopping for 
higher bids, the no shop was in place for less than three weeks, at which point 
the agreement was amended to authorize Trans Union to affirmatively shop for 
higher bids (a “go shop”).346 As mentioned above, the go shop period ran for 
four months.347 Trans Union compensated its financial advisor in a manner that 
motivated it to locate a superior bid,348 but none could be found, in part because 
the initial offer was generous and because the transaction size dramatically re-
duced the pool of potential bidders.349
A go-shop period may not withstand judicial scrutiny if the board deals with 
bidders selectively.  For example, if the target’s board excludes a broad catego-
ry of bidders—say, financial bidders or strategic bidders—the court may deter-
mine that the board wrongly denied itself information necessary to fulfill its fi-
duciary duties.350 In Van Gorkom, Trans Union’s investment banker solicited 
343. See In re NetSmart Technologies, Inc., 924 A.2d 171, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[B]ecause 
of the various problems . . . attract[ing] market attention as a micro-cap public company, an inert, 
implicit post-signing market check does not, on this record, suffice as a reliable way to survey inter-
est by strategic players.”)
344. In re Lear Corp. S’holder  Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 18–19 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing im-
portance of the market’s knowledge that a large public company widely followed by analysts has 
entered into a merger agreement).
345. See In re Toys R Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 (Del. Ch. 2005) (rejecting 
any characterization of M&A players as a “cotillion of the reticent” “too genteel to make . . . unin-
vited overtures”).
346. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870 (“[On] October 9, Trans Union . . . issued a press re-
lease announcing . . . that Trans Union was . . . permitted to actively seek other offers and had re-
tained Salomon Brothers for that purpose . . . .”).
347. See Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops v. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and 
Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 730 (2008) (explaining how go-shop periods often last thirty to 
fifty days); see also Topps, 926 A.2d at 86 (demonstrating that a go-shop period of forty days was 
upheld by the court) (“For forty days, the Topps board could shop like Paris Hilton.”). But see
Subramanian, supra note 229, at 602 (explaining that current go-shops do not require that a defini-
tive agreement be executed during that period and further explaining that, during the go-shop peri-
od, the board commonly must determine that a competing bid is reasonably likely to lead to a supe-
rior transaction).
348. OWEN, supra note 204, at 118 (“[I]f Salomon Brothers were able to beat the Pritzkers’
deal of $55 per share—even by as little as $1 per share—it would receive a fee of over 
$2,500,000.”); id. (noting that the bank would receive $500,000 if it could not find a better deal).
349. Id. at 71–72 (noting that the control premium was consistent with national norms, but 
below regional norms); id. at 120 (“Only a relatively few could afford such a gargantuan deal.”); 
McChesney, supra note 222, at 638 (comparing the premium offered by Pritzker of almost 50% to 
average premia of that time of 30%).
350. E.g., In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“[E]ven if the directors did initially favor private equity bidders, the direc-
tors later authorized Excel to solicit strategic bidders.”); NetSmart, 924 A.2d at 196 (“[T]he Special 
Committee and Netsmart board did not have a reliable basis to conclude that the Insight deal was 
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one hundred bidders, including financial bidders and strategic bidders.351  No 
category of bidder was excluded.
As referenced above, bidders need time to analyze information when formu-
lating a bid, negotiating a transaction, and arranging financing.  So, a go-shop 
period needs to be of sufficient duration so that competing bidders can accom-
plish within the contractually-specified period whatever the transaction contract 
requires.  In Van Gorkom, “at no time during the market test period did any 
[bidder] complain of the time frame or availability of corporate records.”352
Judicial review requires that the board act reasonably, so that it is armed 
with adequate information, not perfect information.353 In Van Gorkom, GECC 
expressed a willingness to offer as much as $60 per share, significantly more 
than Pritzker’s contract offer of $55 per share.354 However, GECC required, in 
addition to the termination of Trans Union’s contract with Pritzker, two or three 
more months to investigate Trans Union and finalize its offer.355 Reasonable-
ness does not require a board to walk away from a generous offer in pursuit of a 
higher offer that may never materialize.356 Moreover, perfection may, but rea-
sonableness does not, require the board to proceed at the pace of the slowest 
bidder.357 GECC proceeded slowly.  First, although General Electric, of which 
GECC was a subsidiary, had been considering a deal with Trans Union even 
the best one because they failed to take any reasonable steps to explore whether strategic buyers 
might be interested in Netsmart.”); In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9991, 1988 WL 
83147, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (finding no Revlon breach when a serious financial bidder re-
quested and received information beyond that provided to a favored financial bidder that paired with 
insiders in an MBO).  See generally Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1288 (“[T]he crucial element supporting a 
finding of good faith is knowledge.”).
351. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 884–85 (discussing KKR, a financial buyer); id. at 896 
(McNeilly, J., dissenting) (referencing strategic buyers, including General Electric, Borg-Warner, 
Bendix, and Genstar, Ltd., none of which made a firm proposal); OWEN, supra note 204, at 120, 122 
(noting that Salomon Brothers screened hundreds of companies, and contacted one hundred poten-
tial bidders).  
352. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 896 n.1 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
353. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1993).
354. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885. Although GECC expressed a willingness to offer $60 per 
share, its offer would have taken longer to consummate, given regulatory hurdles, relative to the 
deal with Pritzker, and Pritzker offered cash, which GECC originally refused to do. See also 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (discussing 
the time value of money when comparing bids); OWEN, supra note 204, at 166. Given the time val-
ue of money and the high rate of interest, GECC would have had to outpace Pritzker’s offer by a 
wide margin. Id.
355. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870, 885.
356. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 616 (Del. Ch. 2010) (collecting situa-
tions where, in pursuit of less certain, higher premia transactions, boards and shareholders bypassed 
more certain, lower premia transactions, and ended up with no transaction: “To pretend that there 
are not dangers in holding out for an even bigger blow out price when the market is fully valuing a 
target is . . . obtuse.”).
357. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 88 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Upper Deck hardly 
moved with the speed expected of an interested buyer that has a limited time in which to secure a 
deal.”).
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before the announcement of the deal with Pritzker,358 GECC was slow to reach 
out to Trans Union.  Trans Union announced the deal with Pritzker on Septem-
ber 22, 1980, and announced its go-shop on October 10, 1980, but GECC did 
not contact Trans Union until November, and did not submit a written proposal 
until mid-January.359 Second, once it began its review, GECC moved “gla-
cial[ly],” conducting a “painstakingly thorough investigation.”360  (Recall that 
Pritzker completed his review in one week.)  Finally, GECC refused to enter a 
bidding war for Trans Union,361 which, to a certain extent, was one of the pur-
poses of the go-shop period.  During the go-shop period, GECC never submit-
ted a firm offer,362 and only KKR submitted a conditional offer,363 but it with-
drew its offer after only three hours.  The following paragraphs address KKR 
and go-shop periods in MBO transactions.
Courts have expressed concern regarding MBOs because managers are in-
siders, who have access to information not generally available to competing 
bidders.364 If the targeted corporation agrees to an MBO without first surveil-
ling the market, the informational advantage enjoyed by the insider-managers 
may lessen the effectiveness of a post-signing market check, as outsiders may 
be hesitant to enter a bidding war against others who possess an informational 
advantage.365 For outsiders to be comfortable outbidding insiders during a go-
shop period, outsiders must have adequate time to review information that they 
likely are seeing for the first time, whereas the insiders have lived with that in-
formation.  Courts may be troubled when insiders, who already have a deep un-
derstanding of the business and who have long had exposure to material non-
358. OWEN, supra note 204, at 166 (“GECC also perceived a possible fit, for it apparently had 
been studying Trans Union’s operations even before the Pritzker merger agreements were an-
nounced.”).
359. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885.
360. OWEN, supra note 204, at 167 (“[T]he Pritzkers . . . act[ed] with breathtaking speed to 
conclude a merger agreement at the earliest possible moment. . . . General Electric . . . cautiously 
assess[ed] the situation and mov[ed] with ‘glacial . . . speed’ . . . .” (quoting Van Gorkom)); id. at 
168 (“General Electric . . . seemed determined to make a painstakingly thorough investigation, 
probing into the far recess of Trans Union’s operations.”).  
361. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885.  Genstar, a Canadian conglomerate, emerged as a poten-
tial bidder in mid-January 1981, but it did not want to engage in a bidding war, it wanted infor-
mation regarding the other bids and the other bidders, and ultimately never submitted a bid.  OWEN,
supra note 204, at 190–91.
362. A third party’s “unwilling[ness] to make a binding offer to acquire [the targeted corpora-
tion] does not imply any [breach of fiduciary duty] on the part of the board of directors.” In re Bio-
Clinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013).
363. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993) (noting 
that, in a Revlon setting, the board can consider whether a bidder’s offer is fully financed or subject 
to a financing condition).
364. See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Even Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 32 (Del. 
2017) (referencing the “information asymmetry”).
365. Id. at 31 (acknowledging that, “when confronting a proposed MBO, possible bidders 
during go-shops purportedly rarely submit topping bids,” but rejecting the assertion given the facts 
of that case).
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public information, have lengthy periods to formulate their bid, but the transac-
tion agreement subjects outsiders to only a short go-shop period.366 Van 
Gorkom turns the typical concern on its head.  Ironically, Pritzker, an outsider, 
quickly assembled a bid in a week (and arranged financing in less than a 
month), but insider-managers, who paired with KKR, in hopes of pursuing an 
MBO, could not assemble a topping bid over the course of several months.  In 
Van Gorkom, Pritzker, the winning bidder, was at an informational disad-
vantage.
Pritzker agreed to buy Trans Union based upon a few days of conversation 
with Trans Union’s consultant and two of its managers,367 not by “send[ing] an 
army of lawyers and accountants into Trans Union’s corporate office . . . to 
snoop around and verify what [he] had committed to buy.”368 Pritzker’s inves-
tigation deviated significantly from the norm, where “a prospective bidder 
[would be expected] go through the company’s books with its auditors and to 
review with Trans Union personnel the assumptions that underlay the [compa-
ny’s] forecast[s] to learn substantially more about the business and what its 
strategies and weaknesses were.”369 Instead, Pritzker obtained “very, very lim-
ited,”370 “high[] level”371 information, which information was accepted without 
challenge or confirmation.372
One would expect that insiders, who possess an informational advantage 
over an outsider like Pritzker that conducted only a limited review, and who 
viewed the price offered by Pritzker as inadequate, to assemble a superior bid.  
While KKR did submit an offer of $60 per share, it promptly withdrew that of-
fer.373  The Van Gorkom court noted that KKR withdrew its bid after one of 
Trans Union’s managers (Jack R. Kruizenga) withdrew from the buyout group, 
and the court suggested that a conversation with Van Gorkom prompted his 
366. Id. at 32 (“[T]he likelihood of a winner’s curse can be mitigated through a due diligence 
process where buyers have access to all necessary information. And, here, Dell allowed Blackstone 
[a third-party bidder] to undertake ‘extensive due diligence,’ diminishing the ‘information asym-
metry’ that might otherwise facilitate a winner’s curse.  Mr. Dell ‘ultimately spent more time with 
Blackstone than any of the other participants, including [the contract bidder].”); Subramanian, supra
note 229, at 638 (“In a March 30 email, a Senior Managing Director at Evercore reminded certain 
Dell employees: ‘[W]e all have to be mindful that Blackstone is looking to accomplish in 4–6 weeks 
what [S]ilverlake had 6 months to do, with the full support and insight of the CEO and [founder]  
behind them.’”); OWEN, supra note 204, at 144 (“[A] leveraged buyout proposal with management 
participation would likely discourage others from making offers.”).
367. OWEN, supra note 204, at 56–67.
368. Id. at 160.
369. Id. at 58.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 160.
372. Id. at 58 (“very limited checking”). 
373. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985) (“The offer was contingent upon 
completing equity and bank financing of $650 million, which Kravis represented as 80% com-
plete.”).
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withdrawal.374  However, an insider contradicts the court’s suggestion.375
Kruizenga—who was viewed as the “most important of Trans Union’s 13,900 
employees,”376 as he managed divisions that gave rise to most of Trans Union’s 
profits and cash flow377—opposed any acquisition that would privatize Trans 
Union because he wanted to continue running his divisions as he saw fit, not 
according to the directives of a new owner.378  Undoubtedly the withdraw of 
Kruizenga contributed to the withdraw of KKR’s offer, but so too did the 
changing market conditions.  Interest rates rose dramatically from the time of 
the Pritzer-Trans Union agreement (and the time that Pritzker arranged his fi-
nancing) to the time that competing bidders were assembling their bids and ar-
ranging their financing.379 The increased interest rates would have increased 
KKR’s expenses and lowered its bid, while leaving Trans Union (and its hun-
dreds of millions in future cash flow) less valuable, hardly circumstances con-
ducive to a topping bid.  While it may have been beneficial to shareholders if 
Trans Union’s board decided to canvass-then-sign,380 instead of sign-then-
canvass, KKR’s inability to assemble a topping bid is not attributable to the 
length of the go-shop period negotiated by the board nor is the board responsi-
ble for Kruizenga’s withdraw from the buyout group, which prompted the with-
draw of KKR’s offer.381
374. Id. at 884-85 (“The offer was contingent upon completing equity and bank financing of 
$650 million, which Kravis represented as 80% complete.”). 
375. OWEN, supra note 204, at 146 (“Many seemed to think that Van Gorkom had somehow 
talked Kruizenga out of participating, even though Kruizenga himself said that Van Gorkom never 
attempted to influence his thinking on the leveraged buyout one way or the other. . . . Romans . . .
gave [a] consistent account. . . .”).
376. Id. at 13.
377. Id. at 86, 90.
378. Id. at 90–91.  While Kruizenga did not want to be accountable to a private owner, other 
managers opposed the Pritzker acquisition for various reasons.  Some managers believed that Pritz-
ker’s price was too low. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867 (reporting the CFO’s position).  Some 
managers simply wanted to be consulted and involved in the decision-making process, rather than 
informed ex post.  Some managers, perhaps sharing Kruizenga’s concern, objected to heightened 
accountability.  Some managers had financial concerns.  OWEN, supra note 204, at 203 (noting 
golden parachute contracts enjoyed by office staff, not c-level officers); id. at 224 (noting that com-
pensation and benefits at Trans Union were superior to those at Pritzker-owned entities, and that 
Pritzker’s expectations of employees’ production were much higher than it had been at Trans Un-
ion); id. at 220 (“It was a good deal for the shareholders, [b]ut from a career standpoint, it was a 
disaster [for me].”) (quoting Trans Union’s Chief Operating Officer).  See generally In re Dollar 
Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597, 599-600 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[T]here is the danger that top 
corporate managers will resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts, or prefer a sale to 
one industry rival rather than another for reasons having more to do with personal ego than with 
what is best for stockholders.”).
379. OWEN, supra note 204, at 179–80 (noting an increase in the prime rate of 12.5% on Sep-
tember 20, 1980 to 21.5% on December 19, 1980, averaging more than 20% in January 1981).
380. Miller, supra note 204, at 189–92.
381. Cf. In re Fort Howard S’holders Litig., CV No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *8, *14 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 6, 1988) (finding no Revlon breach when serious financial bidder requested and received 
information beyond that provided to favored financial bidder, which paired with insiders).
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If KKR could not assemble a topping bid, when given an informational ad-
vantage attributable to the participation of insiders, perhaps the post-signing 
market check served its purpose.  If the $55 contract price withstands challenge 
from competing bidders,382 then, absent another impediment of the sort de-
scribed in Part C.2., the post-signing market check served its purpose and sup-
ports the conclusion that the board was adequately informed that Pritzker’s offer 
was the best available.
d.
While a “no-shop” protects a negotiated deal by preventing the target from 
soliciting competing bids, a stock option rewards an initial bidder who loses the 
target to a higher bidder.383 Pritzker and Van Gorkom understood that someone 
else could have purchased Trans Union for $55.10, slightly more than their ne-
gotiated price, which is why Pritzker negotiated for the stock option.384
The recipient of a stock option may purchase stock from the grantor at an 
agreed-upon exercise price within a specified time.385 The exercise price com-
monly is set near the prevailing market price unaffected by the parties’ acquisi-
tion negotiations.  In Van Gorkom, Trans Union entitled Pritzker to acquire one 
million shares at $38 per share, which was slightly above the then-current mar-
ket price.386 If Pritzker ultimately acquired Trans Union via merger as agreed, 
then the stock option would not be valuable to him; he would own 100% of 
Trans Union stock,387 so the acquisition of additional shares would simply leave 
each share worth less and not improve his financial position.388 However, if 
Trans Union left Pritzker at the altar because a third party was going to acquire 
Trans Union at a higher price, then Pritzker’s stock option would have great 
value.  If KKR successfully acquired Trans Union at $60, then Pritzker’s stock 
option would have been worth $22 million (($60 - $38 per share) X 1,000,000 
shares).  In effect, Pritzker would have bought the shares from Trans Union for 
$38 million and then sold them to KKR for $60 million, pocketing the differ-
ence of $22 million.  Although Pritzker would have wanted to acquire Trans 
Union, he recognized that the fiduciary duties of Trans Union’s board may have 
required the sale to the higher bidder, in which case, Pritzker would walk away 
382. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. 
2017) (“[T]he lack of a higher bid [indicates] . . . that a topping bid involved a serious risk of over-
payment.  If a deal price is at a level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a material 
risk of being a self-destructive curse, that suggests the price is already at a level that is fair.”).
383. Cf. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. 877 A.2d 975, 1015 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he first bidder has 
taken the risk, suffered the search and opportunity costs, and done the due diligence required to es-
tablish the bidding floor.”).
384. OWEN, supra note 204, at 60–61.
385. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2015).  
386. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867 (Del. 1985).
387. The transaction was structured as a cash-out subsidiary merger.  See id. at 863-64.  
388. One doesn’t enrich oneself by cutting a pizza into more, but smaller, slices.
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with something for his efforts.  The stock option may appease a jilted Pritzker, 
but, in effect, the stock option would increase KKR’s acquisition price by, in 
the example above, $22 million.  A stock option can deter subsequent bidding.  
Consequently, courts employ a reasonableness test, balancing the deterrent ef-
fect on subsequent bidders against inducing and compensating the original bid-
der.389 In determining the reasonableness of such stock options, courts consider 
the magnitude of the payment in light of the magnitude of the overall transac-
tion.  Courts routinely uphold payments that induce and compensate the original 
bidder if those payments are three percent of the deal value.390 Using the 
court’s deal value of $690 million,391 and KKR’s withdrawn offer of $60 per 
share,392 the stock option value of $22 million comprised approximately three 
percent of the deal value ($22 ÷ $690), and thus would be permissible under the 
rationale of the Delaware courts.  The stock option did not impede bidders’ pur-
suit of Trans Union during the post-signing market check.
e.
When reviewing a board’s decision, one should consider the information 
reasonably available at the time of the decision, not necessarily subsequent fac-
tual developments.  Nonetheless, subsequent factual developments may impact 
a court’s decision.  As conceded by the Van Gorkom court, the post-signing 
market check might have cured any failure by the board at the time of its origi-
nal decision.  Relatedly, as mentioned above, a court may emphasize the failure 
of a higher bid to emerge as support for a conclusion that the board members 
fulfilled their fiduciary duties.  Moreover, a court may be hesitant to intervene if 
the shareholders—armed with sufficient information—have spoken.393 In Van 
Gorkom, the shareholders overwhelming approved the transaction with Pritzker, 
which suggests that the shareholders were not optimistic about the emergence of 
389. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932 (Del. 2003); Mills Ac-
quisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989); see also infra Part III (noting 
that, according to Delaware Supreme Court precedent, courts first are to determine whether the deal 
protection is preclusive or coercive, and if not, whether the deal protection falls within a range of 
reasonableness). 
390. See infra note 487 (collecting cases regarding termination fees).  One may consider col-
lectively a stock option and a termination fee. See Paramount Commc’ns. Inc. v. QVC Network 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del. 1994) (“Furthermore, the Termination Fee, whether or not unreasonable 
by itself, clearly made Paramount less attractive to other bidders, when coupled with the Stock Op-
tion Agreement.”). See generally Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) 
(“Where all of the target board’s . . . actions are inextricably related, . . . such actions [are] scruti-
nized collectively . . . .”).  
391. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866 (“Having thus chosen the $55 figure, . . . , Van Gorkom 
multiplied the price per share by the number of shares outstanding to reach a total value of the 
Company of $690 million.”).  
392. Id. at 884–85.
393. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015).
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a superior bid.394 The court did not credit the shareholders’ approval because of 
disclosure problems,395 but those problems did not concern the post-signing 
market check.  Additionally, Delaware provided two avenues for relief to those 
Trans Union shareholders who believed that Pritzker failed to offer adequate 
consideration.  First, those shareholders could sue for breach of fiduciary duty, 
but “no other stockholder . . . sought to intervene in [the] proceeding . . . op-
pos[ing] the merger,”396 which the Chancellor considered significant.  Second, 
those shareholders could sue for “fair value” in an appraisal proceeding,397 but, 
out of the more than 12 million shares outstanding, less than 1,000 shares exer-
cised appraisal rights.398 The small number of dissatisfied shareholders sug-
gests that the board members, armed with the results of the post-signing market 
check, fulfilled their fiduciary duties.
III.
When a shareholder challenges a decision of the board of directors, a court 
generally will defer to the board’s decision under the business judgment rule.399
When trying to overcome the presumptions afforded by the business judgment 
rule, a shareholder may prevail if, for example, the directors acted irrationally or 
for reasons of self-interest.400 When a board defends against a hostile bidder or 
favors a preferred bidder, the board members may be acting for reasons of self-
interest by, for example, preserving their positions.401 If a board defends 
against a hostile bidder or favors a preferred bidder, courts more closely scruti-
nize actions by the board of directors of the targeted corporation and require 
them to act reasonably, not just rationally as under the business judgment 
rule.402  The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that, in defending against a 
hostile bidder or favoring a preferred bidder, the board of directors of the tar-
geted corporation cannot preclude the transaction proposed by the hostile or dis-
favored bidder.403 Such preclusive action would be unreasonable and would not 
394. OWEN, supra note 204, at 192–93 (noting that, of the votes cast, ninety percent voted in 
favor, and ten percent opposed, the transaction with Pritzker).
395. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889–93.
396. OWEN, supra note 204, at 194 (quoting Chancellor Marvel).
397. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2018).
398. OWEN, supra note 204, at 194.  
399. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006).
400. See id. at 52, 74.
401. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“When a 
board [defends against] a pending takeover bid . . . [t]here [exists] . . . the omnipresent specter that a 
board may be acting primarily in its own interests. . . . .”).
402. See id. at 954–55; Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45
(“[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a 
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”).
403. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (“[T]he board’s exercise of corporate power to forestall a take-
over bid . . . [is] not absolute.”).
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withstand judicial scrutiny.404 Thus, the court’s inquiry into preclusion pre-
cedes its inquiry into reasonableness: “The . . . directors must first establish that 
the [defensive action or] merger deal protection devices . . . were not coercive 
or preclusive, and then demonstrate that their response was within a range of 
reasonable responses . . . .”405
In the 1980s, when courts struggled to analyze the legal issues emerging 
from the burgeoning field of M&A,406 the Delaware Supreme Court decided 
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., an early application of the 
aforementioned inquiry.407 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the 
defensive actions of Time’s board did not preclude Paramount, the hostile ac-
quirer, from successfully proceeding with its bid, and were reasonable.408 Iron-
ically, however, the court upheld the action by Time’s board that objectively 
precluded Paramount from successfully proceeding with its hostile bid.409 Ex-
amining for the presence of preclusive action sometimes may enlighten the ul-
timate inquiry of reasonableness, but other times, an examination into preclu-
sion proves misleading.  In dicta, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that preclusive conduct may be reasonable.410 As the inquiry in-
to preclusion has yielded misleading, if not ironic, results, and as the Delaware 
Supreme Court has indicated that preclusive action may be reasonable, the court 
should re-examine the utility of the preclusion inquiry as outcome-
determinative regarding reasonableness under Unocal.  At a minimum, the Del-
aware Supreme court should more carefully articulate its intent and then adhere 
to that articulation.411
404. See id. at 955–57; Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995). 
If the board cannot carry its burden under the intermediate scrutiny of Unocal, then a court applies 
heightened scrutiny under the fairness test.  However, it is unclear how the board could carry its 
burden under the fairness test, which is more exacting, if the board could not carry its burden under 
Unocal, which is less exacting. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 
n.18 (Del. 1989).  
405. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003) (internal quota-
tions omitted); see also Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010); Unitrin,
651 A.2d at 1387–88.
406. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There are Circum-
stances in which it is Equitable to Take that Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. 
Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 884 (2005).
407. Time, 571 A.2d 1140.
408. See id. at 1142.
409. “After the ruling, Paramount said it would end its $12.2 billion offer for Time.  It also 
said it would not bid for the combined company.” Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Inc. Gains Control of 
Warner Within Hours of Court Approval, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/
1989/07/25/business/time-inc-gains-control-of-warner-within-hours-of-court-approval.html; see 
infra note 440 (collecting sources).
410. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1988); 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
411. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 120 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“[A] 
poison pill is assuredly preclusive in the everyday common sense meaning of the word; indeed, its 
rasion d’etre is preclusion—to stop a bid (or this bid) from progressing.”); see also id. at 122 n.480 
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Part A. briefly sets forth the facts of Time and the court’s holding.  Part B. 
explains the preclusive effect of the defensive actions by Time’s board.  Part C. 
examines theoretical and case-based scenarios where the preclusive inquiry 
yields misleading results.
A.
In Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., Time’s board was consid-
ering expansion into the entertainment industry during the early 1980s.412
Time—which was organized under Delaware corporate law—sought ownership 
and creation of video programming for its televisions channels as well as global 
expansion, but not at the cost of control over the “editorial integrity and journal-
istic focus of Time.”413 In 1987, Time’s board considered a consolidation with 
Warner, but the transaction was abandoned temporarily.414 In July 1988, 
Time’s board considered a transaction with numerous companies, including 
Warner, Disney, 20th Century Fox, Universal, and importantly, Paramount.415
At that point, the board did not definitively choose a particular transaction part-
ner, but the “board’s consensus was that a merger of Time and Warner was fea-
sible . . . only if Time controlled the board of the resulting corporation and
thereby preserved a management committed to Time’s journalistic integrity.”416
When talks with Warner broke down, Time discussed a transaction with other 
companies, including Paramount, during the latter portion of 1988.417 Capital 
Cities/ABC proposed a merger with Time, but Time ceased discussions when 
Capital Cities/ABC sought to acquire Time, which maintained that it was not 
for sale.418 In January 1989, Time resumed negotiations with Warner, and on 
March 3, 1989, their respective boards approved a stock-for-stock merger of 
Warner into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Time.  Time’s shareholders would 
have to approve the contemplated transaction, not because of any section of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL),419 but because of the rules of the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), on which Time’s shares traded.  Rule 312 
(“Our law would be more credible if the Supreme Court acknowledged that its later rulings have 
modified Moran and have allowed a board acting in good faith (and with a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that a tender offer is inadequate) to remit the bidder to the election process as its only re-
course. The tender offer is in fact precluded and the only bypass of the pill is electing a new board.  
If that is the law, it would be best to be honest and abandon the pretense that preclusive action is per 
se unreasonable.”).  See generally Brian JM Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal 
Standard, 38 J. CORP. L. 835, 837 (2013) (“By now, preclusivity and ‘range of reasonableness’
analyses are dead letters.”).
412. Time, 571 A.2d at 1143.
413. Id. at 1143–44.
414. Id. at 1144
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1145.
418. Id.
419. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2017).
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of the NYSE generally requires shareholder approval upon the issuance of 
twenty percent of a company’s stock.420 Because of their relative sizes and be-
cause Time would be paying a premium to acquire Warner, shareholders of 
Warner collectively would own more than sixty percent of Time’s outstanding 
shares,421 triggering the need for shareholder approval under the NYSE rules.  
The market responded favorably to the contemplated transaction.  However, the 
originally-conceived transaction was doomed to fail when, on June 8, 1989, 
Paramount announced that it would buy any-and-all shares of Time for $175 
(later upped to $200) per share, when Time’s shares had been trading at $126 in 
the wake of the announcement of the planned Time-Warner transaction.422
Time’s shareholders would not vote in favor of a transaction that required the 
payment of a premium to others (the shareholders of Warner) when Paramount 
was prepared to pay a premium to them for their shares.  Consequently, in 
hopes of effectuating the Time-Warner deal, the principals restructured the 
transaction to avoid the need to obtain the approval of Time’s shareholders.423
In the restructured deal, Time would pay cash to the shareholders of Warner to
acquire a controlling stake in the company.424 Thereafter, Time would effectu-
ate a merger of Warner and a subsidiary of Time, with the merger consideration 
comprised of a mix of cash and stock of Time, but less than the twenty percent 
threshold of the NYSE.425 Neither step—not the cash purchase of Warner 
stock, nor the cash-and-stock merger of Warner and a subsidiary of Time—
required the approval of Time’s shareholders.
When shareholders challenged the transaction, the Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded that Time’s board fulfilled its fiduciary obligations.  The original 
agreement between Time and Warner was the product of a valid exercise of 
420. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c).
421. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1146.
422. Id. at 1147.  Cf. Black & Kraakman, supra note 316, at 528 n.21 (discussing how Time’s
acquisition of Warner could not have been better for Time’s shareholders than Paramount’s offer, 
“unless one assumes that the market made errors of implausible size in valuing Time, Warner, or the 
synergy between the two companies”).
423. Initially, Warner cared a great deal about the structure of its transaction with Time.  
Time, 571 A.2d at 1145.  However, when the control premium to be received by Warner’s share-
holders was in jeopardy, Warner’s board cared more about effecting a deal to preserve its share-
holders’ receipt of a premium and cared less about the nature of the consideration that produced that 
premium.
424. Though Time’s shareholders faced a high offer for their shares, Warner’s shareholders 
had not been presented with a bid higher than Time’s offer.  The holders of a majority of Warner’s
shares were expected to, and ultimately did, accept Time’s cash offer.  Geraldine Fabrikant, Time 
Inc. Gains Control of Warner Within Hours of Court Approval, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1989, at A1 
(“Time Inc. today gained control of Warner Communications Inc. . . . Time completed its tender 
offer for 51 percent of Warner’s shares at 5:01PM.  Three hours earlier, the [Delaware Supreme 
Court] unanimously upheld a ruling . . . that rejected attempts . . . to block the Time-Warner deal.”).  
Thereafter, the second-step merger of Warner and a Time subsidiary was a foregone conclusion, as 
both board- and shareholder-approvals were guaranteed.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2017). 
425. Time, 571 A.2d at 1147–49.
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business judgment by Time’s board.426 Time’s board methodically considered  
numerous transaction partners and rationally concluded that Warner was a good 
fit because of its solid entertainment unit and its international presence.427
When Time restructured its deal with Warner, Time’s board was defending 
against Paramount, which required the application of Unocal and its enhanced 
scrutiny.428 Nonetheless, Time’s board reasonably investigated and, in good 
faith, perceived that Paramount posed a threat to Time’s journalistic integrity as 
well as its well-conceived transaction with Warner.429 In restructuring the ac-
quisition of Warner, Time’s board did not, according to the court, preclude Par-
amount from buying Time; Paramount could still proceed with its offer for 
Time, but, of course, in buying Time, Paramount would also be buying Warn-
er.430 The court concluded that the defensive actions employed by Time’s 
board were reasonable.431
B.
The Time court referenced only one means of Paramount effecting an acqui-
sition of Time—a tender offer directly to Time’s shareholders—and the Time
court did not factor into its analysis the presence of Time’s poison pill.432 From 
the 1970s into the 1980s,433 bidders commonly pursued hostile acquisitions via 
tender offers.434 In 1982, Martin Lipton famously invented the poison pill,435
which was approved by the Delaware Supreme Court in a series of decisions 
beginning with Moran in 1985.436 The increasing prevalence of the poison pill 
prompted hostile bidders to utilize a proxy contest alone or in conjunction with 
a tender offer in hopes of effecting an acquisition.437  The alternate means of 
426. Id. at 1151–52.
427. Id. at 1143–46, 1151–52.
428. Id. at 1152.
429. Id. at 1153–54.
430. Id. at 1154–55.
431. Id. at 1155.
432. Id. at 1144 n.5 (“Time had in place a panoply of defensive devices, including a staggered 
board, a ‘poison pill’ preferred stock rights plan triggered by an acquisition of 15% of the company, 
a fifty-day notice period for shareholder motions, and restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call a 
meeting or act by consent.”).
433. Some trace the rise of hostile acquisitions, which once had been frowned upon, to Mor-
gan Stanley’s representation of a hostile bidder in 1974.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law 
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1287–91 (1999) (citing RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE 
OF MORGAN 599-601 (1990)); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy:
How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 850 (1999) (citing BRUCE 
WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEALS 470 (1998)).
434. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985).
435. Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2002).
436. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
437. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbari-
ans Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993). 
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pursuing a hostile acquisition—tender offer or proxy contest—prompted alter-
native analyses of preclusion: “A response is ‘preclusive’ if it deprives stock-
holders of the right to receive all tender offers or precludes a bidder from seek-
ing control by fundamentally restricting proxy contests or otherwise.”438 If
either avenue remains open to the hostile bidder, the defensive action (or favor-
itism towards the preferred bidder) is not preclusive.  Part B.1. criticizes the 
preclusion analysis of Time on the court’s own terms—without considering the 
presence of Time’s poison pill.  Part B.2. then reconsiders Time given the com-
pany’s poison pill.
1.
Although the Time court technically was accurate—Paramount theoretically 
could have acquired Time—the Delaware courts require that, to prove that a 
hostile transaction was not precluded, the directors cannot simply establish a 
theoretical possibility of a hostile transaction, instead the hostile acquisition 
must be “realistically attainable.”439 Paramount’s hostile acquisition of Time 
was realistically unattainable due to the preclusive, defensive action of Time’s 
board.440
A defensive acquisition by the target “may change the nature of the business 
and financial picture of the target and may make it less desirable to the [hostile] 
bidder.”441 In acquiring Warner, Time changed both the nature of its business 
and its financial condition, making it less desirable to Paramount, and ultimately 
precluding its hostile acquisition.  Though Time’s acquisition of Warner may
438. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003).
439. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113 (Del. Ch. 2011).
440. Tamar Frankel, Presumptive Reasoning Applied to Legal Doctrine: Presumptions and 
Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 776 
n.62 (1994) (“[I]n Paramount v. Time-Warner, . . . management was allowed to preclude sharehold-
ers from selling at $200 shares that traded at $126 . . . .”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 816 n.115 (2003) (“Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. . . . permit[ted] a particular defense—Time’s tender offer for 
Warner—that, as a factual matter, was preclusive. The court dodged this problem with the assertion 
that, at least in principle, Paramount could bid for the merged company. . . . [T]his theoretical possi-
bility solve[d] the preclusiveness problem” for the Time court.); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoreti-
cal and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporation Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV.
579, 610–11 (1992) (“Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. . . . is a dramatic example of 
the extent to which the board is permitted to take a broad view of its corporate responsibilities by 
precluding stockholders from taking advantage of control transactions.”); Julian Velasco, Structural 
Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 890 (2004) (“The board’s con-
duct should not have been upheld because it was . . . preclusive in that it would prevent the com-
bined company from being acquired for the foreseeable future.”).
441. 1A MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOUTS & FREEZEOUTS § 6.06[6], at 
6-244 (1991).
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have been reasonable,442 it cannot have been preclusive, as preclusive action is 
per se unreasonable.443
Because Warner was about the same size as Time, Time doubled in size 
when it acquired Warner.  Time’s transaction did not simply involve some as-
sets, even key assets, either of which may have withstood judicial scrutiny.444
Time’s increased size alone may have precluded Paramount from proceeding 
with its hostile offer,445 but larger acquisitions certainly have occurred.  Regard-
less of Time’s increased size, the nature of the additional assets precluded Par-
amount from proceeding with its bid.  By acquiring Warner, loosely-speaking a 
movie studio, Time added assets that would have been redundant to Para-
mount,446 loosely-speaking a movie studio.447 Paramount pursued Time, not 
Warner; Paramount never wanted Warner.  The Time court held that Paramount 
could still acquire Time (and Warner), but the Delaware courts’ preclusion 
analysis concerns whether the alternative transaction is “realistically attainable,” 
not simply a theoretical possibility.
Time compelled Paramount to pay premia for things it could not utilize and 
upon which it could not realize fair value.  A numerical example may prove 
helpful.  Assume that, based solely upon their respective per-share trading pric-
es, Peanut Butter Co. is worth 10 units and Grape Jelly Co. is worth 12 units.  
As the Delaware Supreme Court correctly noted, a bidder must pay a control 
premium above the per-share trading price to effect an acquisition.448 So, as-
sume that Peanut Butter Co. would pay 14 units to acquire Grape Jelly Co.449
Peanut Butter Co. would do so because combining the two companies (PB&J 
Co.) creates synergistic value above the aggregate stand-alone values of those 
two companies.450 If Bread Co. wanted to buy PB&J Co., it effectively would 
442. Black & Kraakman, supra note 316, at 528 & n.21 (“[A]n objective observer would like-
ly conclude that the Time board’s decision was, in fact, crazy. . . .”).
443. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 122 n.480 (“[P]reclusive action is per se unreasonable.”); see also
Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 683 (2013) 
(“[C]ertain types of preclusive lock-ups remain[] per se invalid . . . .”).
444. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
445. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 441, § 6.06[6], at 6-244.
446. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1554–55 (2013) 
(discussing redundancy and potential for counterproductivity).
447. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., CBS Scandal is Neatly Timed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2018 at 
A15 (“CBS probably is not sellable to Comcast or Disney, both of which already own broadcast 
networks . . . .”). Moreover, antitrust considerations may have barred Paramount’s acquisition of 
Time-Warner, but that is far from clear.  See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 441, § 6.06[6], at 
6-244.
448. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del. 1990); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875–76 (Del. 1985).
449. Recall that Warner’s shareholders would have owned more than sixty percent of Time 
under the original transaction structure, Time, 571 A.2d at 1146, which is consistent with this nu-
merical example.
450. See generally Black & Kraakman, supra note 316, at 528 n.21 (discussing how Time’s
acquisition of Warner could not have been better for Time’s shareholders than Paramount’s offer, 
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pay a premium for each of Peanut Butter Co. (12 units) and Grape Jelly Co. (14 
units), for the synergistic value created by the combination of those two compa-
nies (1 unit), and some portion of the synergistic value created by adding Bread 
Co. and those two other companies (1 unit).  Bread Co. might have to pay 28 
units to acquire PB&J Co.  Now, if Bread Co. wanted to acquire only Peanut 
Butter Co. while it was still a stand-alone company, the acquisition price would 
have been the assumed 12 units.  However, if Bread Co. wanted to acquire only 
Peanut Butter Co. after the formation of PB&J Co., then it would have to pay 
the assumed 28 units for PB&J Co. and then hopefully sell Grape Jelly Co. for 
14 units, which was the assumed amount paid by Peanut Butter Co. to acquire 
Grape Jelly Co.  Bread Co. would lose 2 units in the process, which is a signifi-
cant amount over the 12 units required to acquire only Peanut Butter Co.451 As 
a hyperbolic example, one does not buy a car to acquire a small box in which 
one may store gloves, only to sell everything but the glovebox.
Translating the discussion above to the Paramount-Time-Warner setting, 
Paramount would face additional, preclusive problems. While the combination 
of Bread Co. and Grape Jelly Co. may generate synergistic value, there ap-
peared to be no synergy between Paramount and Warner.452 So, Paramount 
would have to buy Warner and pay a premium to do so, and it would be paying 
premia on, first, Warner’s combination with Time, and second, on Warner’s 
combination with Paramount.  However, Paramount would be paying for some-
thing that it would never receive.453 Moreover, additional loss likely would re-
sult because Paramount would be in a poor negotiating position if it tried to sell 
Warner.  Recall that, aside from Time, no other bidders emerged to buy Warner. 
So, after paying a premium, Paramount likely would sell Warner on the 
cheap.454 Finally, after paying a premium for their three-way combination, Par-
amount would bust up the Time-Warner combination, which would result in a
loss, not the gains seen from the 1980s of busting up mismatched conglomer-
ates.  These circumstances reveal that Time’s acquisition of Warner precluded 
Paramount from bidding for the combined company, notwithstanding the con-
clusion of the Time court.455
“unless one assumes that the market made errors of implausible size in valuing Time, Warner, or the 
synergy between the two companies”).
451. See infra note 488 and accompanying text (addressing preclusive termination fees well 
shy of 16% (2-unit loss/12-unit price)).  
452. Gevurtz supra note 446, at 1554–55 (discussing redundancy and potential for counter-
productivity).
453. Id. (discussing how gains would flow to shareholders of Warner, not Time nor Para-
mount).
454. Id. (discussing how Paramount could not pay a premium for Warner if Warner was re-
dundant or counterproductive, and instead could pay no more than the price at which it could be 
spun off); see Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., CBS Scandal is Neatly Timed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2018 at 
A15 (“CBS probably is not sellable to Comcast or Disney, both of which already own broadcast 
networks . . . .”).  
455. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del. 1990).
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Moving on from the impact of the defensive acquisition on the nature of the 
target’s business, one should consider the financial condition of the target after 
it effected its defensive acquisition.  After effecting the cash acquisition of a 
controlling interest in Warner, which was followed by a cash-and-stock merger 
to complete the acquisition, Time-Warner was saddled with over $10 billion in 
debt.456 Paramount offered cash to acquire Time’s shares.  There is no indica-
tion that Paramount could have managed its own debt, while assuming the debt 
incurred by Time to acquire Warner, and Time’s directors bore the burden of 
proof regarding preclusion.457 Others believe that Time’s resulting financial 
condition precluded Paramount from completing an acquisition,458 notwith-
standing the conclusion of the Time court.459
2.
The Time court never analyzed Time’s poison pill, which is addressed in 
this section.  Poison pills preclude tender offers,460 by inflicting voting and eco-
nomic dilution on a hostile bidder.461 If Paramount pursued a hostile tender of-
fer for control of Time, Paramount would have passed the fifteen percent trigger 
of Time’s pill and suffered the dilutive impact.462 Nonetheless, according to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, poison pills are not preclusive.  First, the incumbent 
board may redeem the pill if the hostile bidder’s offer becomes sufficiently gen-
erous.463 Second, if the incumbent board refuses to redeem the poison pill, it 
must withstand judicial inquiry under Unocal.464 Third, even if the incumbent 
board refuses to redeem the poison pill consistent with Unocal, the hostile bid-
der may launch a proxy contest to unseat the incumbent board; presumably the 
newly-elected board will be amenable to the bidder’s proposed acquisition and 
456. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the com-
pany struggled to manage the $10 billion in debt, and that its stock price fell).  
457. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Defendants 
bear the burden of showing that their defenses are not preclusive . . . .”).
458. See Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 821, 890 (2004) (noting the incurrence of debt and concluding that the “radical . . . restructur-
ing . . . would have serious operational consequences for the company”).
459. Time, 571 A.2d at 1155.
460. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 101 (“[T]he pill is serving the principal purpose of precluding the
shareholders from tendering into Air Products’ offer.”).
461. Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeo-
ver Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002); 
see also Strine, supra note 406, at 886.
462. Time, 571 A.2d at 1144 n.5 (noting 15% trigger).
463. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 
1986) (“The board further agreed to redeem the rights and waive the covenants on the preferred 
stock in response to any offer above $57 cash per share.”).
464. See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 599 (Del. 2010); Moran v. Household 
Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356–57 (Del. 1985).
Spring 2019] Unintentional Irony 235
will redeem the pill.465 The preclusion inquiry accounts for the possibility of 
overcoming a poison pill via a proxy contest.466 So, even if the hostile bidder’s 
tender offer may be precluded, the board may withstand Unocal scrutiny if the 
hostile bidder may realistically attain success in a proxy contest.
Though the Time court never referenced the possibility of Paramount 
launching a proxy contest to secure control of Time, that possibility bolsters the 
court’s rationale.  Nonetheless, the court’s conclusion remains problematic.  
Time’s board noticed an annual meeting for June 23, 1989, at which Paramount 
theoretically could have launched a proxy contest.467 When Time restructured 
its deal with Warner, however, the annual meeting of shareholders was deferred 
until after Time acquired a controlling interest in Warner,468 which occurred on 
July 24, 1989.469 Time’s organizational documents effectively precluded Para-
mount from convening a meeting of shareholders at which Paramount could 
conduct a proxy contest prior to Time’s acquisition of Warner.470
More importantly, Time featured a staggered board of directors,471 which 
means that only one-third of its board of directors was elected in any single 
year.472 Even if Paramount launched a successful proxy contest, which tends to 
be expensive,473 those newly-elected directors would comprise a minority of the 
board, and the pill would remain in place.  Paramount would have to wait an-
other year and incur the expense of a second proxy contest to seat, over the two-
year period, a majority of the board, which then presumably could redeem the 
poison pill to facilitate Paramount’s acquisition of Time-Warner.  Notwith-
standing the deterrent effect of such time and expense, the Delaware Supreme 
Court, in Versata, concluded that the combination of a staggered board and a 
465. The Delaware courts barred slow-hand and dead-hand pills.  See Quickturn Design Sys., 
Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 
1998).
466. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003).
467. See Paramount Commcn’s Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10866, 1989 WL 79880, at *10 (Del. 
Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d sub nom. Literary Partners, L.P. v. Time Inc., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989), 
and aff’d, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989), and aff’d sub nom. In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig., 565 A.2d 
281 (Del. 1989).
468. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (2017) (“If there be a failure to hold the 
annual meeting . . . for a period of 30 days after the date designated for the annual meeting, . . . the 
Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held upon the application of any stock-
holder or director.”).
469. Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Inc. Gains Control of Warner Within Hours of Court Approv-
al, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1989, at A1 (“Time completed its tender offer for 51 percent of Warner’s
shares at 5:01PM.  Three hours earlier, the [Delaware Supreme Court] unanimously upheld a rul-
ing . . . that rejected attempts . . . to block the Time-Warner deal.”).
470. Time, 571 A.2d at 1144 n.5.
471. Id. (noting Time’s “panoply of defensive devices, including a staggered board”).
472. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2017).  Moreover, if a board is staggered, shareholders 
may remove directors during their terms only “for cause.” Id. § 141(k).
473. See Jeff Mordock, DuPont Spent $15M to Keep Activist Investor Off Board, USA
TODAY (May 19, 2015, 10:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/05/19/
dupont-spent-15m-proxy-fight/27575179/.
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poison pill was not preclusive.474  Compelled to adhere to binding precedent, 
Chancellor Chandler questioned its wisdom: “[N]o bidder to my knowledge has 
ever successfully stuck around for two years and waged two successful proxy 
contests to gain control of a classified board in order to remove a pill.”475 If, 
with the passage of time, no bidder overcomes the combination of a staggered 
board and a poison pill, then the courts should reconsider whether overcoming 
that tandem is merely a theoretical possibility or realistically attainable.476
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the leading precedent of the Delaware Su-
preme Court addressing poison pills differs importantly from the facts of Time.
In Moran,477 Quickturn,478 and Versata,479 the targeted corporation was simply 
saying “no” to the hostile acquirer, not undertaking an alternative transaction. In 
those cases, the targeted corporation would be the same company at the time 
that it precluded the hostile tender offer as it would be at the time of a proxy 
contest.  However, Time would differ dramatically; at the time of the hostile 
tender offer, Time was a stand-alone company, but at the time that Paramount 
might have launched a proxy contest, Time would have become Time-Warner.  
If, contrary to the holding of the Time court, we accept that facilitating the 
Time-Warner transaction precluded Paramount’s tender offer, then the possibil-
ity of launching a proxy contest to gain control of Time-Warner should not 
yield a different outcome.  As mentioned before, the theoretical possibility of 
launching a proxy contest does not mean that it was realistically attainable.480
C.
Beyond the Time court’s ironic conclusion, the preclusion inquiry itself 
seems unhelpful.  Presumably, the preclusion inquiry was intended as a helpful 
filtering device to avoid the inquiry into reasonableness—ex post judicial sec-
474. Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010) (“The fact that a combina-
tion of defensive measures makes it more difficult for an acquirer to obtain control of a board does 
not make such measures realistically unattainable, i.e., preclusive.”).
475. Air Prods. & Chems. Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also id. at 
113 n.436 (“Indeed, Airgas’s own expert testified that no bidder has ever replaced a majority of di-
rectors on a staggered board by winning two consecutive annual meeting elections.”); Bebchuk, 
Coates & Subramanian, supra note 461, at 914 (“[T]o our knowledge, no bidder has successfully 
fought through two proxy contests to win control of a . . . target [with an effective staggered 
board].”).
476. Perhaps the Versata case will be less troubling over time as the market has begun trend-
ing away from staggered boards. See Steven J. Cleveland, A Failure of Substance and a Failure of 
Process: The Circular Odyssey of Oklahoma’s Corporate Law Amendments in 2010, 2012, and 
2013, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 221, 235 (2015) (“In 2004, over 50% of the S&P 500 companies had stag-
gered boards, but at the end of 2012, only 17% of the S&P 500 companies had staggered boards.”).
477. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
478. See Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
479. See Versata, 5 A.3d at 588.
480. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 113.
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ond-guessing by institutionally incapable actors.481 If, however, the preclusion 
inquiry does not produce the intended benefits, or worse proves counterproduc-
tive, then the Delaware Supreme Court should reconsider its usage as an out-
come-determinative filtering device.  Part C. applies the preclusion inquiry to 
forms of deal protection and concludes that inquiry is not helpful.
1.
A termination fee is a form of deal protection, which incentivizes an initial 
bidder to expend resources negotiating an agreement with the targeted corpora-
tion, and which rewards the initial bidder if a different bidder ultimately ac-
quires the targeted corporation after making a superior bid.482 Technically, the 
targeted corporation pays the fee to the jilted bidder, but effectively the success-
ful acquirer pays the fee.  The Delaware courts acknowledge the conceptual 
soundness of a termination fee,483 but recognize that a termination fee deters 
subsequent bidders.484 At some point, the magnitude of the termination fee pre-
cludes subsequent bidders.485  In determining the validity of termination fees, 
courts examine the magnitude of the fee in comparison to the deal value.  Alt-
hough the inquiry is contextual,486 courts routinely conclude that termination 
fees that amount to three percent of the deal value are neither preclusive nor un-
481. See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994) (“[A] 
court should not ignore the complexity of the directors’ task . . . . The board of directors is the cor-
porate decisionmaking body best equipped to make these judgments. Accordingly, a court applying 
enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not 
a perfect decision. If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not sec-
ond-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have 
cast doubt on the board’s determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their business judgment for 
that of the directors . . . .”).
482. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 48–49 (Del. 1997).
483. Id. at 49 (upholding a termination fee that falls “within a range of reasonableness”).
484. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003) (“Deal Protec-
tion Devices Require Enhanced Scrutiny”).
485. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“The preclusive 
aspect of any termination fee is properly measured by the effect it would have on the desire of any 
potential bidder to make a topping bid.”).
486. Louisiana Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (“[A]nalysis [of a termination fee] will, by necessity, require the Court to consider a 
number of factors, including without limitation: the overall size of the termination fee, as well as its 
percentage value; the benefit to shareholders, including a premium (if any) that directors seek to 
protect; the absolute size of the transaction, as well as the relative size of the partners to the merger; 
the degree to which a counterparty found such protections to be crucial to the deal, bearing in mind 
differences in bargaining power; and the preclusive or coercive power of all deal protections includ-
ed in a transaction, taken as a whole. The inquiry, by its very nature fact intensive, cannot be re-
duced to a mathematical equation. Though a ‘3% rule’ for termination fees might be convenient for 
transaction planners, it is simply too blunt an instrument, too subject to abuse, for this Court to bless 
as a blanket rule.”).
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reasonable.487 Courts have concluded that termination fees of six-to-seven per-
cent of the deal value do not pass Unocal scrutiny.488
Determining whether a termination fee precludes a subsequent bidder may 
be helpful in some cases, but the inquiry misses the mark in other cases.  Craft-
ing an analysis that begins with preclusion and moves on to reasonableness only 
if the board proves that the defensive action was not preclusive yields false 
positives and false negatives.
Two numerical examples may prove helpful. Assume that we know, but the 
Target does not, that the highest value that any bidder places on Target is $100 
per share.  Target aggressively negotiates with Bidder 1 and extracts an offer of 
$99 per share, the absolute maximum amount that Bidder 1 is willing to pay, 
while Bidder 1 extracts a termination fee of three percent from Target.  The 
termination fee would preclude Bidder 2, who values Target at a maximum of 
$99.50 per share, as well as Bidder 3, who values Target at a maximum of $100 
per share.  Nonetheless, such a termination fee would be deemed reasonable and 
pass Unocal muster, notwithstanding its preclusive effect.489 The Delaware 
courts have acknowledged this possibility:
Deal protections, of course, do provide a bidding cushion for merger partners that 
makes small, margin-topping bids non-viable. When that cushion results . . . from a 
good faith negotiation process in which the target board has reasonably granted 
487. Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49 (holding that a 2% termination fee is not preclusive and “falls 
well within the range of termination fees upheld as reasonable by the courts of this State”); Kysor 
Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d 889, 897 (Del. 1996) (upholding, as not preclusive, a rea-
sonable termination fee of 2.8% of offer); Miramar Firefights Pension Fund v. AboveNet., Inc., No. 
7376-VCN, 2013 WL 4033905, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2013) (upholding, as not preclusive, a “ter-
mination fee representing roughly two percent of the deal’s equity value . . . [which] ha[d] been re-
peatedly upheld by the Court as reasonable under similar circumstances”); In re Plains Exploration 
& Prod. Co. S’holder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) 
(“The three percent termination fee ($207 million) was also not unreasonable.”); Goodwin v. Live 
Entm’t, No. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *20 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (upholding, as not preclusive, a 
reasonable termination fee of 3.125% plus $1 million in expenses for a total percentage of 4.167%); 
In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 503 (Del. Ch. 2010) (upholding, as not preclusive, a 
termination fee of 3% of the equity or transaction value).
488. In re Comverge, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *1, *17 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss where the “aggregate value of those termina-
tion payments reache[d] approximately 13% of the equity value of the transaction, well more than 
double the termination fee percentages that this Court has found to be at the upper bounds of rea-
sonableness” which had an “impermissibly preclusive effect”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus 
Amax Minerals Co., No. 17398, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (concluding, in dicta, 
that a termination fee of 6.3% is not reasonable).
As discussed above in Part II, the Delaware courts analyze stock options similarly.  See Para-
mount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he Stock Option 
Agreement had become ‘draconian.’”).  See generally Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (“Where all of the target board’s . . . actions are inextricably related, . . .
such actions [are] scrutinized collectively . . . .”).  
489. See Crawford, 918 A.2d at 1181 n.10 (listing preclusive effect as only one of many fac-
tors to be considered).  
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these protections in order to obtain a good result for the stockholders, there is no 
grounds for judicial intrusion.490
In penning that language, then-Vice Chancellor Strine acknowledged preclusive 
action may be reasonable; the Delaware Supreme Court has also acknowledged 
this possibility.491 Moreover, in examining termination fees, courts commonly 
undertake a reasonable analysis, without referencing preclusion.492  Under the 
Unocal analysis, however, if the defensive action is preclusive, then the court 
never undertakes the reasonableness analysis.  Yet, in this hypothetical, the de-
fensive action seems preclusive but reasonable.  The preclusion analysis pre-
sumably was intended as a helpful filtering device—if it is preclusive, then it 
cannot be reasonable493—but ultimately may yield erroneous results.
Consider another numerical example.  Assume that we know, but the Target 
does not, that the highest value that any bidder places on Target is $90 per 
share.  Target aggressively negotiates with Bidder 1 and extracts an offer of $60 
per share,494 the absolute maximum amount that Bidder 1 is willing to pay, and 
Target extracts a termination fee of fifteen percent, “more than double the ter-
mination fee percentages” approved by Delaware courts.495 Though Bidder 2, 
who values Target at a maximum of $65 per share would be precluded from 
making a topping bid, Bidder 3, who values Target at a maximum of $90 per 
share, could easily make a topping bid of, say, $75 per share that would gener-
ate surplus for all involved.  In this hypothetical, the termination fee would not 
be preclusive, but would be unreasonable.496 In these examples, the preclusion 
analysis yields misleading results.
2.
Another form of deal protection—voting agreements—may operate to pre-
clude subsequent bidders.  In Omnicare, voting agreements precluded the hos-
tile transaction, and failed the scrutiny of a 3-2 majority of the Delaware Su-
preme Court,497 but, notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion to the contrary, 
490. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1021 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
491. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1989); Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
492. See Brazen, 695 A.2d 43; see also Kysor Indus. Corp., 674 A.2d 889.
493. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 122 n.480 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(“[P]reclusive action is per se unreasonable.”).
494. Great disparities may emerge between the price originally negotiated by the targeted 
corporation and the price that a hostile bidder will pay.  See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 
Inc., 673 A.2d 34, 38–41 (Del. 1993) (noting that the initial contract price was $70 per share and the 
hostile bidder eventually offered $90 per share); Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1270–71, 1277–78 (noting 
that original management restructuring valued target at $64.15 per share and that hostile bidder 
eventually offered $90.25 per share).
495. In re Comverge, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *17 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 25, 2014).
496. See id.
497. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 2003).
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the deal protection, including the voting agreements, seemed reasonable given 
the facts of the case.  According to the Omnicare court, the voting agreements 
of the controlling shareholders of NCS, who were also board members, preclud-
ed the hostile acquirer’s superior bid, when the acquisition agreement included 
a force-the-vote provision and did not include a “fiduciary out” right of termina-
tion.498 Two shareholders agreed to vote to approve the transaction with the fa-
vored bidder—Genesis—while retaining the right as directors to withdraw their 
recommendation of that transaction in favor of a superior bid.499 Nonetheless, 
the transaction agreement required that a shareholder meeting be convened to 
enable the shareholders to vote on the transaction with Genesis, even if the di-
rectors no longer recommend that transaction, which occurred,500 and which is 
permitted by the DGCL.501 Moreover, the transaction agreement did not permit 
the board of directors of NCS to terminate the agreement if a superior bid 
emerged; that is, there was no “fiduciary out.”502  Thus, given the three deal-
protective measures—voting agreements regarding a majority of votes, a force-
the-vote provision, and no “fiduciary out”—NCS’ transaction with Genesis was 
a fait accompli, even though a superior bid emerged.503 Employing the Unocal
analysis, a majority of the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the deal pro-
tection was preclusive and unenforceable.504
Yet two dissenting justices and many commentators believe that the board’s 
defensive actions should have been upheld as reasonable,505 given the underly-
ing facts, which briefly follow.  Beginning in 1999, NCS experienced financial 
trouble,506 and soon was in default on approximately $350 million in debt, with 
its stock trading as low as $0.09 (until the announcement of its deal with Gene-
sis).507 NCS retained an international investment bank to aid in its exploration 
of strategic alternatives.508 The bank contacted potential acquirers and received 
only one indication of interest, but the initial offer failed to cover NCS’ out-
standing debt, and that already-low offer was lowered during due diligence.509
498. Id.
499. See id.
500. Id. at 925. 
501. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146 (2017) (“A corporation may agree to submit a matter to a 
vote of its stockholders whether or not the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to 
approving such matter that such matter is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders 
reject or vote against the matter.”).
502. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936–39.
503. Id. at 936.
504. Id. at 939. 
505. Id. at 943 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (joined by J. Steele); see, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, The 
Omnipresent Specter of Omnicare, 38 J. CORP. L. 753, 755 (2013) (“In the wake of Omnicare, I 
argued . . . that the decision was a mistake.  Ten years later, it still is.”).
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After its financial condition worsened, NCS considered a “pre-packaged” bank-
ruptcy but the offers were inadequate.510 “[A]ny recovery for NCS stockholders 
seemed impossible.”511 In 2001, Omnicare, which eventually became the hos-
tile bidder, proposed an acquisition, but its offer would not have covered the 
outstanding debt (and thus provided nothing for shareholders),512 and it required 
that the acquisition be structured under a specific provision of the bankruptcy 
code.513 When its offer was not accepted, Omnicare began working with note-
holders, rather than continuing to negotiate with NCS, and, in 2002, made an-
other proposal that would not cover NCS’ debt.514 NCS began confidential ne-
gotiations with Genesis, which made a proposal that would repay NCS’ debt 
and also provide consideration to NCS’ shareholders.515 However, Genesis, 
having previously lost to Omnicare a target with which it was negotiating, re-
fused to be a stalking horse and required that its deal be locked up.516 At the 
eleventh hour, fearing that another company would acquire NCS and pose a 
competitive threat, Omnicare tried to re-engage with NCS, but its offer included 
a due-diligence condition.517 (Recall that, when NCS previously tried to sell 
itself, a bidder lowered its bid after conducting due diligence.518)  NCS used 
Omnicare’s appearance to extract additional consideration from Genesis, but 
not relief from the lock-ups.519 After NCS and Genesis executed an agreement, 
Omnicare stepped forward with a superior proposal, but the NCS-Genesis deal 
was a fait accompli, precluding an acquisition by Omnicare.520 The court was 
correct that the deal protection precluded a hostile acquisition by Omnicare,521
but weren’t the actions by NCS’ board reasonable?
Wasn’t it reasonable for the NCS board to believe that Genesis would 
cease negotiations if NCS engaged with Omnicare, when Omnicare pre-
viously acquired a corporation with which Genesis was negotiating?522
510. Id. at 921.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).  Some are troubled by corporate acquisitions via Section 363 
because they skirt the general disclosure-and-voting requirements of plans of reorganization.  See In 
re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1983).
514. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921.
515. Id. at 922–23.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 924.
518. Id. at 920.
519. Id. at 924–25.
520. Id. at 936.
521. The majority did not discuss Omnicare’s ability to acquire Genesis-NCS, as the Time
court had discussed Paramount’s ability to acquire Time-Warner.
522. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 941 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not disputed by the Major-
ity that the NCS directors made a reasoned decision to accept as real the Genesis threat to walk 
away.”).
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After Omnicare was given the opportunity to make a reasonable offer, 
and had only low-balled NCS, wasn’t it reasonable for the NCS board to 
favor the certainty of a generous transaction with Genesis?523
Wasn’t it reasonable for the NCS board to refuse to re-engage with Om-
nicare based on its offer being subject to a due-diligence condition, 
when another company lowered its offer after conducting due dili-
gence?524
Wasn’t it reasonable for the NCS board to lock up the transaction, given 
that Genesis offered consideration to NCS’ shareholders, which previ-
ously seemed an “impossibility,” and when no prior offer even covered 
NCS’ debt?525
Wasn’t it reasonable for the NCS board to believe that, if Genesis 
walked away, Omnicare would lower its bid, given that its superior pro-
posal emerged only because of the presence of Genesis?526
Wasn’t it reasonable for the NCS board to agree to forego possibly 
higher bids, when two of those board members—who had “no insidious, 
camouflaged side deals”—owned significant minority stakes?527
Notwithstanding the Unocal analysis, under which preclusive action is per se
unreasonable, preclusive action may be reasonable.  Even the Delaware Su-
preme Court has recognized this possibility in dicta.  In Macmillan, the court 
wrote, “If the grant of an auction-ending provision is appropriate, it must confer 
a substantial benefit upon the stockholders in order to withstand exacting scruti-
ny by the courts.”528 “Auction-ending” means that one bidder was favored to 
the point that any other bidders were precluded, otherwise the auction would be 
on-going.  Similarly, in Revlon, the court wrote, “Favoritism for a white knight 
to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable when the latter’s 
offer adversely affects shareholder interests . . . .”529 “To the total exclusion of 
523. Id. at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“Certainty itself has value. The acquirer may pay a 
higher price for the target if the acquirer is assured consummation of the transaction. The target 
company also benefits from the certainty of completing a transaction with a bidder because losing 
an acquirer creates the perception that a target is damaged goods, thus reducing its value.”); see Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisi-
tions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 328 (1990); Sean J. Griffith, The Costs And Benefits Of Precommit-
ment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 613 (2004).
524. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 941 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Omnicare’s due-
diligence condition was “crippling” to its offer).
525. Id. at 943 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“The NCS board’s actions—as the Vice Chancellor 
correctly held—were reasonable in relation to the threat because the Genesis deal was the ‘only 
game in town.’”).
526. Id. at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“Omnicare . . . could have changed its mind and 
again insisted on an asset sale in bankruptcy.”); id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting) (noting that NCS 
faced anything from “silence [and] tepid interest to outright hostility from Omnicare”).
527. Id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting). Accord Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995) (giving credence to the value perceptions of board members who owned 
significant stakes in the target).
528. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1989).
529. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
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a hostile bidder” certainly sounds like that bidder was precluded.  Based upon 
that dicta, the Delaware Supreme Court endorsed preclusive conduct so long as 
the target’s shareholders enjoyed a substantial benefit or averted substantial 
harm.  In Omnicare, the locked-up deal with Genesis provided shareholders 
with substantial consideration when that previously was thought to be an “im-
possibility,” and engaging with Omnicare risked the deal with Genesis, which 
could have resulted in substantial harm to NCS’ shareholders.530 The preclusive 
conduct seems reasonable, which possibility was foreordained by the Delaware 
Supreme Court.  Again, the preclusion analysis seems counterproductive to the 
court’s ultimate concern for reasonableness.
IV.
Beam exhibited unintentional irony as the court held that directors would 
not trade on their reputations for minimal gain, when one of them did trade on 
her reputation for minimal gain.  Having failed to acknowledge the irony, the 
court failed to address its logical inconsistency.  Cognitive biases seemingly ex-
plain Stewart’s quick decision, but those biases are less persuasive regarding a 
board’s deliberative response to a shareholder’s demand, which response would 
be subject to judicial (and public) review.
Van Gorkom also exhibited unintentional irony as the court concluded that a 
competing bidder could not reach an agreement and finance its bid in the allot-
ted period when that period significantly exceeded what was necessary for the 
favored bidder.  Notwithstanding the prevalence of director-protective charter 
provisions authorized by DGCL Section 102(b)(7), Van Gorkom remains an 
important and misleading data point, given its relevance in the Revlon setting 
and the courts’ emphasis that plaintiffs pursue injunctive relief for such 
claims.531
Time also exhibited unintentional irony, concluding that preclusive conduct 
was not preclusive.  Perhaps the preclusive inquiry should be eliminated as a 
“dead letter,” but that seems overkill, as preclusive conduct commonly is not 
reasonable and should be struck down.532 Perhaps, the preclusive inquiry 
should remain as an outcome-determinative precursor to the reasonableness in-
quiry, but more limited in scope.533 But that fails to account for the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s dicta that preclusive conduct may be reasonable, as well as the 
practice—in the termination-fee setting—of examining reasonableness without 
reference to preclusion.  Perhaps, the preclusion inquiry should inform the rea-
sonableness inquiry without being outcome-determinative of the matter.  Then-
530. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“The Vice Chancellor correctly 
found that they reasonably perceived the threat that NCS did not have a viable offer from Omnica-
re—or anyone else—to pay off its creditors, cure its insolvency and provide some payment to 
stockholders.”).
531. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015).
532. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 411, at 837 (describing preclusivity as a “dead letter”). 
533. See Laster, supra note 336, at 811.
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Vice Chancellor Strine disfavored complicated redundant inquiries, advocating 
for elimination of Blasius’ compelling-justification inquiry, when Unocal’s rea-
sonableness inquiry could do the necessary work.534 That is, if, as in Blasius,
the directors impede the shareholders’ franchise—an extreme action by direc-
tors—the threat to those shareholders must be extreme.  Unocal’s reasonable-
ness/proportionality inquiry suffices to fulfill the goal of Blasius.  So, too, with 
preclusion, which generally will be found to be unreasonable, but, as the Dela-
ware Supreme Court notes, may be reasonable in limited circumstances.535
534. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007).
535. See Strine, supra note 406, at 885, 892 (disfavoring bright-line, per se inquiries for is-
sues of fiduciary duty and equity).
